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ABSTRACT
In the face of globalization and technological developments, the legal
premise that patents are territorial rights is under strain. Historically, courts have
admitted defeat to territorial restraints, and thus refused to find in favor of patent
infringement when a portion of the infringing activities is occurring outside the
relevant country of protection. This issue has persisted largely because of a
formulaic assumption that all claim elements must be achieved and that all
components of the infringing acts must occur within the country where the patent
was allegedly infringed. But as inventions increasingly cross borders, it has become
doubtful whether such rigid legal expectations conforming to territoriality are
sustainable. There is a growing trend in many jurisdictions towards engaging in
more far-reaching practices of localizing infringements, which serve to protect the
patent holder from suffering as a result of substantive discrepancies between
different countries. Most of these forms of extraterritorial application, however,
have been inconsistent at best and unsubstantiated at worst. Courts have devised
undefined tests, such as localizing patent infringement based on the “substance”
or “core” of the invention, where commercial effects can be felt within the country
of protection, or where the infringing activities manifest control and accrue benefits
deriving from use of the invention. In the face of these legal irregularities ongoing
in different jurisdictions, patent holders and users are combating against
unpredictability and lack of uniformity while states are confronted with lack of
control.
This article submits a new proposal to closing this patent loophole. It is
argued that a closer emphasis on what is the proper substantive framework for
each infringing conduct is called for, linking technical appropriation of the
invention closer to a technical analysis while considering commercial appropriation
under its rightful commercial lens. For what amounts to technical appropriation,
courts would defer to what is the locus of the technical contribution of the invention
as it is manifested in the infringing conduct, whereas for commercial appropriation,
courts would instead turn to what is the locus of the commercial impact and control
in the infringing activities. With that close link to proximity, traditional territorial
norms are maintained without absolute cost to cross-border patent enforcement.
What has been identified as the relevant nexus then forms the basis for a

comparative analysis, which is carefully curtailed and defined. It seeks to limit an
extraterritorial application to where it is actually necessary in light of the
competing sovereign, public and private interests at stake. A more finite
comparative approach such as this fills an existing gap, where courts routinely
localize infringements with little to no consideration as to how that impacts foreign
conduct and states. This altogether strikes a proper and much needed balance
between efficacious and predictable patent protection across borders, while still
respecting fundamental concerns owed to sovereignty and uniformity.
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CLOSING THE PATENT LOOPHOLE ACROSS BORDERS
MATTIAS RÄTTZÉN*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a legal maxim that patents are territorial rights. Patents are granted
on a national basis and patent holders seeking protection in multiple countries are
invited to procure multiple national rights. Yet the traditional notions of
territoriality in patent law are under stress. It is acknowledged that there is an
inherent struggle between the territorial nature of patent rights and the
transnational realities of commerce and technology.1 Territoriality of patent law is
based on the assumption that the scope of the exclusive rights is limited to each
national grant. But just as commerce is increasingly global, infringing activities
coincide less neatly with national borders. Depending on the technical field, the
subject matter is also becoming prone to disseminate across borders.
Territoriality is an inherently ambiguous concept.2 With legislatures
largely remaining passive, with some exceptions in the United States, and with
little to no guidance at an international level, courts in different jurisdictions have
long struggled with understanding its legal constraints and extensions.
Historically, courts have been largely hostile towards enforcing patents outside
their respective country of protection,3 and rightly so, but in the face of
globalization that premise is becoming less convincing. While some courts in the
United States have persisted, although inconsistently, in refusing to find for
* © Mattias Rättzén 2021, ORCID: 0000-0001-7330-8178, Mattias Rättzén is a graduate of
Harvard Law School (LL.M. 2020), University of Oxford (PGDip in IP 2019) and Lund University
(jur.kand. 2015). He is an admitted attorney in Sweden and the author of several articles on
intellectual property law and public and private international law. In addition to working in
private practice with intellectual property law and commercial law, he was a member of the
Swedish SCCR delegation at WIPO in Geneva for several years. The present article is a revised
version of the author's master thesis submitted at Harvard Law School, with Professor William
Fisher as supervisor, and which won Second Prize in the Annual Writing Competition from the
Boston Patent Law Association.
1 There is an abundance of legal literature on the topic, see generally John R. Thomas,
Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent
Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277 (1996); Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in
U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119 (2008); Timothy A. Cook, Courts as Diplomats:
Encouraging an International Patent Enforcement Treaty through Extraterritorial Constructions
of the Patent Act, 97 VA. L. REV. 1181 (2011); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Resolving Patent Disputes in
a Global Economy, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 610
(Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008); Marketa Trimble, GLOBAL PATENTS: LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT (2012); Nari Lee, Fragmented Infringement of Computer Program Patents in the
Global Economy, 48 IDEA 345 (2007); Rainer Moufang, The Extraterritorial Reach of Patent Law,
in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 601 (Josef Drexl et al. ed.,
2009); Agnieszka Kupzok, Enforcement of Patents on Geographically Divisible Inventions: An
Inquiry into the Standard of Substantive Patent Law Infringement in Cross-Border
Constellations (Ph.D. dissertation, Ludwig Maximilian University, 2014).
2 See Paul Edward Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of Laws and Internet
Remedies, 22 E.I.P.R. 125, 134 (2000) (noting the uncertainties that exist in localizing infringing
acts).
3 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 533 (1972) (no infringement
where separate components were manufactured domestically and then assembled and sold
abroad); Akre-Vickery, Norwegian Supreme Court, Rt. 1933, 529 (Nor.) (no infringement for
products ordered and sold from Norway, but which were manufactured abroad and had never
entered Norwegian territory).
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infringement when infringing activities that fall under patent claims have been
geographically divided,4 courts in other countries, such as Germany5 and the
United Kingdom6, have considered more expansive readings of patent statutes and
patent claims as a legal necessity.
To illustrate the questions that may arise in this context, assume that a
patent covers a system for a machine learning model, which involves the use of
computing devices configured to receive sourced data, process data, configure an
algorithm and to complete a particular machine learning model. For each claimed
configuration there is a set of routine operations to be completed, including
receiving requests to perform the computational services and validating such
requests. Further assume that a third party uses the same machine learning
technique to create a mobile application that sources substantial amounts of user
data and then reads and transforms that data into usable content in the
application. If each operation is performed on servers in different countries, and if
users whose data is sourced and users who use the mobile application reside in
different countries, some where there is a patent and some where there is none,
where does a prospective infringement take place? A number of possibilities could
be thought of, ranging from where data is collected and where servers are located
to where users are residing. Each point of contact could in theory be sufficient to
render liability, but that seems to ignore that a full and complete infringement is
not performed anywhere. The inclination to catch all infringing acts in one go
clearly struggles with the fact that patent protection remains territorial.
Furthermore, if patent protection has not been procured in all implicated countries,
or if there are differences in patentability, there could be large legal gaps. This in
turn raises the question whether cross-border conduct manifesting in those
jurisdictions should remain to be treated with impunity in other jurisdictions
where there is an enforceable patent. Inventions such as the one described are
becoming increasingly commonplace, but despite that there is currently no
universal solution in place to articulate clear and uniform criteria for balancing
long-standing territorial legal norms with new technological and commercial
realities.
From the perspective of right holders, disparate legal treatment of
inventions in different jurisdictions is harmful to the spread of technology. Markets
are at risk of becoming partitioned if an infringement can freely occur in one
country, but not in another. Moreover, the development of technology that is
susceptible to transnational use is at risk of being deterred if a lower level of
protection afforded in one country is expanded extraterritorially, thus avoiding
infringement anywhere for prospective infringers. From the perspective of users,
the opposite situation in which a higher level of protection is expanded
extraterritorially would be deemed an illegitimate and unfair commercial practice,
threatening international trade and ultimately impeding public access. Sovereign
interests are caught in the middle between these extremes. The grant of exclusive
4 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (no
infringement of a process claim, but infringement of a system claim, where not all steps were
performed domestically).
5 Prepaid-Karten II, Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf, Dec. 10, 2009, 2 U 51/08, (Ger.)
(infringement of a method claim where there was an intention to effect and enjoy a commercial
advantage in the domestic market).
6 Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and Wales High Court, EWHC 2930
(Pat) at 507–08 (U.K.) (infringement of a method claim where the substance of the invention was
exercised domestically through collecting material subsequently used to perform the method
abroad).
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patent rights is a benefit afforded by the state to further national public policies.
There is an assumption, originating from notions of territoriality, that such grants
will not interfere with foreign activities, just as it is assumed that foreign activities
will not themselves interfere with the exercise of patent rights. The different
interests at stake are in competition with each other, and if left unrestrained, are
at risk of exhausting one another.
With multiple jurisdictions implicated in the case of divided patent
infringement, and with different substantive norms and interpretations, it is clear
that finding common ground or achieving clarity is acute in avoiding a patent
loophole. This article proposes a new approach to closing that loophole. Whereas
previous theories have primarily focused on localizing infringements based on the
“substance” or “core” of the invention,7 substantial effects,8 commercial effects,9 a
dual infringement approach,10 or the degree of domestic control and accrued
benefits,11 this article argues that none of these approaches coherently and
sufficiently grasp the differing circumstances that arise in patent infringement
contexts. There is a tendency to treat all infringing scenarios under the same legal
lens, even if there are clear substantive differences in their legal treatment. It is
argued that this calls for a closer emphasis on what is the proper substantive
framework for each infringing conduct, linking technical appropriation of the
invention closer to a technical analysis while considering commercial appropriation
under its rightful commercial lens. This substantive legal split provides uniformity
and certainty where it is needed the most. What has been identified as the relevant
nexus then forms the basis for a comparative analysis which seeks to limit an
extraterritorial application to those situations where it is actually necessary in
light of the competing sovereign, public, and private interests at stake.
II. THE MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL LANDSCAPE FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
The environment for exercising inventions is becoming increasingly
multi-jurisdictional in nature. While there is nothing new with products and
services incorporating inventions crossing borders, the extension of patent
protection to intangible subject matter in particular has brought an overwhelming
exchange of protected information. The use of an invention across borders raises a
series of novel and complex questions in the case of patent infringement. These
questions stem from the fact that cross-border conduct necessarily means that the
activity subject to legal scrutiny is not occurring fully and completely within a
single country of protection.
A. Divided Patent Claims
The patent claim defines the scope of the invention in technical terms.
Patent claims customarily include a preamble, a transitional phrase, and a body.
The preamble identifies the category of the invention, including but not limited to

7 Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., [2002] England and Wales Court
of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1702 at 33 (U.K.); Iris Haupt, Territorialitätsprinzip in Patent- und
Gebrauchsmusterrecht bei grenzüberschreitenden Fallgestaltungen, GRUR 187, 189 (2007).
8 Melissa F. Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial Scope of
Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 302–03 (2007).
9 Prepaid-Karten II, Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf, Dec. 10, 2009, 2 U 51/08 (Ger.).
10 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2183–85.
11 Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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a product, system or method, and in doing so may define the object of the
invention.12 The transitional phrase acts as a link between the preamble and the
specific elements of the claim, as defined in the body. 13 It is the body of the patent
claim that must recite the elements, and thus also the limitations, of the
invention.14 Divided patent claims are such claims that include elements capable
of being divided between different countries.15 That is, even if the patent grant is
national, the invention is such that it can be carried out across borders. This is
dependent on the claim category and technology at issue. Product and system
claims encompassing specific components or parts can sometimes be manufactured
and distributed with ease separately, only to be assembled or consummated
somewhere else. Method claims may include a series of steps that must be
performed to achieve the intended technical effect. Patents extending to intangible
subject matter such as software, artificial intelligence and telecommunications
often rely on method or system claims to properly define the scope of the invention.
Information technology necessarily implicates that information can be transferred
from one location to another, making it no surprise that this, coupled with the pace
of globalization, makes these types of inventions particularly prone to be exercised
across borders. Finally, biotechnology inventions also pose unique challenges, as
biological material is often reproduced and distributed through components and
subsequently analyzed as transferrable information which can be distributed to
other countries.16
A classic divided patent claim situation is thus where there is partitioning
of the making or use of the invention between different countries. If the wording of
the claim stipulates a series of components or steps, and some of those are located
or performed outside the country of protection, then there is a serious question of
where a patent infringement occurs, if at all. This makes the situation for
cross-border patent infringement quite different from that of copyright and
trademarks. A text or a piece of music cannot be divided between countries without
rendering it useless, nor can the words of a logo be partly used in different
countries. But for patents, the property is not always defined through single
components or steps, and the intended technical effect behind an invention can
sometimes be achieved despite the fact that everything does not exist or is
performed at the same time and place.
B. Divided Infringing Acts
Not only the patent claim, but also the infringing activity can be subject to
partitioning between countries.17 Even if an exclusive right is statutorily provided
in singular terms, it can sometimes be fragmented into portions which in turn each
12 Keith A. Zullow & Raivo A. Karmas, Anatomy of an Issued Patent, 53(4) CEREAL FOODS
WORLD 236, 238–39 (2008).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q. J. 255, 256 (2005).
16 See Jennifer L. Schuster, Combining the Components of Life: The Application of Patent
Extraterritoriality Doctrine to Biotechnology, 83 IND. L.J. 363, 386–92 (2008) (explaining the
potential issues of extraterritoriality that could arise for biotechnology inventions).
17 A related partitioning of infringing conduct, which is not covered in this article, is when
the conduct is divided between different actors. No single party performs all steps listed in a
patent claim, but rather the infringing activities are performed collectively by two or more parties,
whether domestically or across borders. See Nathaniel Grow, Resolving the Divided Patent
Infringement Dilemma, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2016).
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can be performed in different locations.18 One such situation is when the invention
at issue is a divided patent claim. If the invention concerns a product comprising
of multiple components or parts, and if those are made and assembled separately
in different countries, the question arises where the act of making is considered to
legally occur. If the invention instead concerns, for example, a software or business
method encompassing multiple steps, the issue similarly turns to where use of that
software or method is deemed to occur. Another and more common case for
fragmented infringing activities exists, regardless if a divided patent claim is at
issue, when the act itself presupposes multiple steps. This is the case for offering
for sale and selling,19 which necessarily assumes that there is both an act of offering
or selling and an intended recipient. The question then turns to where the act of
offering or selling is deemed to legally occur, if the recipient is located in a different
jurisdiction. That issue is also replicated for cases of indirect patent infringement.
III. TERRITORIALITY OF PATENT LAW
A. The Traditional Territorial Approach
Patents have been named as the most territorial form of intellectual
property rights.20 Whereas other intellectual property right statutes are often
silent on territorial scope, patent statutes in such jurisdictions, such as the United
States and the United Kingdom,21 expressly limit the exclusive rights to the given
territory. Still, even in the absence of an express statutory territorial limitation, it
has never been doubted that the exclusive rights afforded by national patents are
limited to the respective country of protection. This fundamental assumption stems
principally from sovereignty and the independence of patent rights.22
The effective power of a state to legislate is inherently limited to the
territorial reach of the state.23 As phrased by Mr. Justice Story of the United States
Supreme Court in 1824, “[t]he laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own
territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no force to
control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction.”24
Lee, supra note 1, at 365–66; Moufang, supra note 1, at 605–12.
Denise W. DeFranco & Adrienne N. Smith, Technology and the Global Economy: Progress
Challenges the Federal Circuit to Define the Extraterritorial Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 34 AIPLA
Q. J. 373, 378–83 (2006); Andrew S. Kerns, Fight or Flight: Traversing the Extraterritorial
Battlefield of Modern United States Patent Law, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 462, 469–73 (2011).
20 Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 605 (1997).
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2021) (“Whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”); The Patents Act, 1977
§ 60(1) (U.K.) (“a person infringes a patent for an invention if . . . he does any of the following
things in the United Kingdom in relation to the invention without the consent of the proprietor
of the patent.”).
22 Toshiyuki Kono & Paulius Jurčys, General Report, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 15–16 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2012);
Jürgen Basedow, Foundations of Private International Law in Intellectual Property, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE
RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE US (Jürgen Basedow et al. ed., 2010).
23 Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 26–30 (1964); Frederick A. Mann, Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After
Twenty Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 20 (1984); Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in
International Law 18–19, 39–41 (Ph.D. dissertation, Leuven University, 2007).
24 The Appollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
18
19

[21:358:2021]

Closing the Patent Loophole Across Borders

363

But sovereignty signifies not only the boundaries of a state’s own laws. The
independence and equality of state sovereignty likewise denotes a duty to recognize
the same territorial limits of other states.25 This was most famously established in
the S.S. Lotus case.26 The question posed was whether Turkey had violated
international law by assuming jurisdiction over a French ship which had docked
within Turkish waters for alleged criminal offenses having occurred on the high
seas.27 The Permanent Court of International Justice held that international
jurisdiction is inherently territorial, and that a state may not exercise its power
within the territory of another state.28 But notwithstanding that premise, the
Court also concluded that a state is not prohibited from exercising prescriptive
jurisdiction within its own territory, in respect of acts which have taken place
abroad.29 Rather, states have a substantial margin of appreciation in stipulating
the conditions for the applicability of national law.30 In this sense, the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction is exclusive and concurrent at the same time. It is
exclusive in the sense that no other states may interfere with the sovereignty of
another, but concurrent in the sense that each state may exercise jurisdiction
independently over the same act.
The notion of territorial jurisdiction that was articulated in S.S. Lotus is
still the fundamental basis for asserting jurisdiction,31 and is now understood to
encompass two distinct principles of jurisdiction: subjective and objective
territoriality. Subjective territoriality refers to when states exercise jurisdiction
over acts commenced within the state but consummated abroad, whereas objective
territoriality is when states exercise jurisdiction over acts commenced abroad but
consummated within the state.
The grant of a patent is an act of the state. It is an administrative decision,
undergoing the most rigorous and burdensome examination procedure amongst all
intellectual property rights. While international routes for simplifying patent
application procedures in multiple jurisdictions exist, agencies of the state in each
country remain the ultimate arbiters of whether or not to grant a national patent. 32
International standards in patent law merely set a minimum level of
harmonization, as articulated foremost in the Paris Convention 33 and the TRIPS
25 Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 829, 838–39
(1928). See also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), [1970] ICJ REP.
3, at 105 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice; holding that state jurisdiction is not unlimited
in public international law, as it involves “for every State an obligation to exercise moderation
and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign
element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or
more appropriately exercisable by, another State.”).
26 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927).
27 Id. at 5.
28 Id. at 18–19.
29 Id. at 19.
30 Id. at 18–19. See also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), [1970]
ICJ REP. 3, at 105 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice; holding that “international law does
not impose hard and fast rules on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction . . . but leaves
to States a wide discretion in the matter.”).
31 Harold
G. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law,
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 65–69, 83–84, 90 (Karl M. Meessen
ed., 1996); Ryngaert, supra note 23, at 38.
32 See Article 4bis of the Paris Convention; Cameron Hutchison & Moin Yahya,
Transnational Telecommunications Patents and Legislative Jurisdiction, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 52–53 (2008).
33 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, U.N.T.S.305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
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Agreement34. In the absence of a global patent, each state has the onus of crafting
its own laws and policies to best further the incentive to innovate and balance it
against the interests of the public. The international patent system is therefore
based on the prosecution of independent national rights, sharing some, but not
exhaustive, substantive commonalities to obtain a wider scope of protection.35
The translation of the principle of territoriality, as underpinned in the
international patent system, has been less than obvious. Historically, courts, most
notably in the United States, opted for a more narrow and strict understanding.
Going as far back as 1856, the United States Supreme Court held in Brown v.
Duchesne that, “these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate
beyond the limits of the United States; and as the patentee’s right of property and
exclusive use is derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which
the law itself is confined.”36 That same notion later echoed in Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v.
Minn. Moline Plow Co., reaffirming that “[t]he right conferred by a patent under
our law is confined to the United States and its territories and infringement of this
right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”37 At the time,
these restrictive statements in the United States were in line with what was
understood as a presumption against extraterritoriality, not exclusive to patent
law but applicable to all federal statutes.38 The presumption against
extraterritoriality functions as a canon of statutory interpretation mandating that
legislation in the absence of a contrary, clear, and affirmative intent only operates
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state.39 If congressional intent can be found
in the statute supporting that it can be applied extraterritorially, the question
turns to whether the “focus” of the statute involved conduct that occurred abroad.
If that is the case, then the application of the statute to such foreign conduct is
deemed an impermissible extraterritorial application, even if some other conduct
occurred within the United States.40
Somewhat more recently, that presumption was reaffirmed in the context
of patent law in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp,41 where the United States
Supreme Court was confronted with whether manufacturing of separate
components to be assembled and sold abroad was an infringement within the
United States. The Court held it was not, stressing that the language of the statute
makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product
outside of the United States.42 The patent at issue protected the combination of
components, so the manufacturing of separate components could not amount to an
infringement, even if later assembled abroad, in the absence of congressional
mandate.43 That express mandate later arrived in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), which
prohibits the supply of unassembled components of a patented invention to or from
the United States if their combination is induced abroad. But notwithstanding that
34 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,
33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
35 See Article 4bis of the Paris Convention.
36 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (no infringement in the United States to use an invention on a
foreign vessel docking at national ports).
37 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (denying damages for infringing products sold abroad not
attributable to an infringement in the United States).
38 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
39 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255, 261 (2010).
40 Id. at 249, 266–67; RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
41 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
42 Id. at 527.
43 Id. at 528.
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subsequent legislative intervention, the decision in Deepsouth does reflect a
reluctance from courts to expand the application of national patent statutes to
conduct occurring abroad. That same traditional sentiment was even more recently
adhered to in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.44 This case turned on the
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), specifically whether it was an infringement in
the United States by sending master discs containing infringing software from the
United States, when that software was later installed on foreign computers.45 The
United States Supreme Court answered this in the negative, excluding software in
abstract as opposed to tangible form from constituting a component under the
statute.46 The Court also considered that no infringing copies were supplied from
the United States, since the copies of the software did not actually exist until
installation was made on the foreign computers abroad.47 The presumption against
extraterritoriality was used as a vehicle to support the narrow reading of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f), explaining that “[t]he presumption that United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent
law.”48 The Court was not blind to the very real risk that its decision could create
a legal loophole for software patents, but deferred that potential problem to
Congress, should it wish to close it.49
The well-known case NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. (NTP II) reveals
a similar restrictive approach to cases of divided infringement of method patents.
Here, the Federal Circuit held that a process, but not a system,50 cannot be deemed
to be used within the United States, as required under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), if any
single step of the method is performed abroad.51 The method claim in the patent at
issue in that case, involving a remote e-mailing system, was therefore not infringed
when one of the steps was performed outside the United States.52 The outcome in
NTP (II) is akin to the approach taken in Deepsouth, in that it presupposes that all
constituent parts of the invention must be localized to the relevant country of
protection. The argument originates from what is commonly known as the “all
elements rule,” which makes it clear that for there to be direct patent infringement,
the product or service must include every claim element.53 But when that rule is
enforced rigorously through a territorial lens in cross-border contexts, what is
otherwise so basic and fundamental makes little sense. It ignores that infringing
parties can circumvent the exclusive patent rights by organizing the infringing
activities, whether that is intentional or following the flow of modern business
patterns, so that parts of them are completed in different countries.
550 U.S. 437 (2007).
Id. at 448–49.
46 Id. at 449–50.
47 Id. at 452–54.
48 Id. at 454–55.
49 Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 456.
50 NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1317.
51 Id. at 1318.
52 Id. at 1322–23.
53 See Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (all individual
elements in a claim are deemed material, both for direct infringement and infringement under
the doctrine of the equivalents); Eli Lilly v. Actavis U.K. Ltd. & Ors, [2017] United Kingdom
Supreme Court, UKSC 48, per Neuberger at 65–66 (U.K.) (an immaterial variant achieving
substantially the same result as the invention, as defined in the claim, in substantially the same
way can still infringe). For a more detailed comparative view, also encompassing Germany and
Japan, see William T. Ralston, Foreign Equivalents of the U.S. Doctrine of Equivalents: We’re
Playing in the Same Key But It’s Not Quite Harmony, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 177, 185–87
(2007).
44
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B. The Utopia of Substantive Harmonization
Since patents are territorial rights granted on a national basis and
regulated by national laws, substantive differences in patent law and practice
between different jurisdictions is a natural phenomenon. While some of these
differences are trivial, others are much more comprehensive. Perhaps most
important, however, are the exclusive rights conferred to the patent holder.
Although the TRIPS Agreement in Article 28(1) does list the exclusive rights to
make, use, offer for sale, sell, and import patented products and products obtained
by patented processes, the meaning of these rights, and hence their scope, is subject
to national interpretation. This becomes all the more important, and all the more
obvious, in cross-border infringement cases, as will be discussed further below.
Not surprisingly, harmonization of patent law has sometimes been phrased
as the retort to territoriality. If patent law would be harmonized across the world,
then it would not matter which law is applied, and to what extraterritorial extent,
in a given case.54 But that is an oversimplification. As the above-mentioned
experiences from the United States confirm, territoriality is a concept that
commands the legal treatment of both the infringing act and the infringed claim.
Even if there would be no conflict of patent laws, there would be a conflict of patent
rights. An all elements rule, if strictly enforced everywhere, would still mean that
there would be no patent infringement anywhere. The real problem, therefore,
stems from distinct patent rights.
The only remaining solution to achieve full harmonization would then be a
single, unitary patent right.55 The benefits of unitary intellectual property rights
are many, and are well, although certainly not universally,56 recognized. Conflicts
of both laws and rights are avoided, thus improving predictability and certainty,
and there is great promise in substantive and procedural efficiencies. In Europe,
unitary intellectual property rights have already existed for decades, but never to
the exclusion of national intellectual property rights. Rather, they have been used
to supplement existing, and already harmonized to a substantial degree,
intellectual property systems in the different Member States. The unitary patent
is one such example, which even though it has yet entered into force it is seen as a
promising and much-needed move towards greater uniformity and efficiency in the
European patent system.
But it is one thing to achieve a more limited political consensus at a
regional level. It is another thing entirely to do so at a global level. If history has
taught us anything, it is that international negotiations in intellectual property
law, including patent law,57 are exceptionally difficult and slow-moving. With

54 Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 633–34; Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age
of Globalization: The Necessity and Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 127, 137–38 (2011).
55 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Enforcing Intellectual Property Claims Globally When Rights are
Defined Territorially, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW FORMS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Daniel J. Gervais & Susy Frankel eds., 2016).
56 See Trimble, supra note 1, at 16–18; Anthony D. Sabatelli, Impediments to Global Patent
Law Harmonization, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 579, 582–92 (1995); Randy L. Campbell, Global Patent
Law Harmonization: Benefits and Implementation, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 620–27
(2003).
57 See Philippe Baechtold et al., International Patent Law: Principles, Major Instruments and
Institutional Aspects, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 38–39, 70–71 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015).
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optimal levels of protection likely to be diverging, in particular between developing
and developed countries, unification would require significant political and
economic compromises while not necessarily bringer greater social welfare.58 But
even if we assume that harmonization would be a favorable step forward, it would
still be insufficient on its own. Substantive norms and rights, even if identical,
would be liable to be subject to different interpretations. A multinational court
system, similar to what is also proposed in the context of the unitary patent in
Europe and which is dedicated to resolving patent disputes, would therefore be
needed.59
C. Procedural Consolidation through Adjudication of Foreign Patents
While it is now commonplace to procure rights in multiple jurisdictions,
enforcement is still predominantly limited to suing on a country-by-country basis.
If infringement is occurring in multiple jurisdictions where there is patent
protection, then to the extent that the patent holder believes this to be warranted,
a suit may be brought in each of those jurisdictions. The most invoked and
traditional basis for such a national enforcement routine has been territoriality.60
The Federal Circuit held as late as 2007 in Voda v. Cordis Corp. that “a patent
right to exclude only arises from the legal right granted and recognized by the
sovereign within whose territory the right is located. It would be incongruent to
allow the sovereign power of one to be infringed or limited by another sovereign’s
extension of its jurisdiction.”61 But it would be misleading to characterize this
statement as a universal and current norm. While it is true that there has
historically been a trend against adjudicating foreign patents, including other
intellectual property rights,62 in many jurisdictions, the tide has been turning for
the last decades towards permitting that form of procedural consolidation. For
instance, the position in the United Kingdom is now deemed to have reversed after
the Supreme Court ruled, contrary to previous theories and beliefs, that the respect
for foreign sovereignty does not bar adjudicating foreign intellectual property

58 Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 634–35; TRIMBLE , supra note 1, at 16–17; John F. Duffy,
Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 703–06 (2002);
Christopher Heath, Harmonisation of International Patent Law? – A Reply to Straus and Klunker,
39 IIC 210, 214 (2008).
59 Trimble, supra note 1, at 17.
60 Thomas, supra note 1, at 278.
61 476 F.3d 887, 902. (Fed. Cir. 2007).
62 For decisions refusing to adjudicate foreign patents, see Lampen, Imperial Court of Justice,
1890, 19, 32–33 JW 280, 107/90 I (Ger.); Yema v. Jenny e.a., High Court of Paris, [1974] 63 Rev.
crit. DIP 110, 111 (Fr.). For decisions refusing to adjudicate foreign copyright, see Tyburn
Productions Ltd. v. Conan Doyle, [1991] England and Wales High Court, Ch. 75 (U.K.); Duhan v.
Radius Television Prod. Ltd., [2007] Irish High Court, IEHC 292 (Ir.); Atkinson Footwear Ltd. v.
Hodgskin Int’l Servs. Ltd., [1994] NZHC31 IPR 186, 190 (N.Z.); Gallo Africa Ltd. and Others v.
Sting Music (Pty) Ltd., [2010] Supreme Court of Appeal 40/2010 ZASCA 96 (S. Afr.).
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rights.63 Similarly, courts in Germany64 and Japan65 have now held that
territoriality in itself does not impede assuming adjudicative jurisdiction in
intellectual property cases.
Adjudicating multiple patents before a single, national court is an
attractive option for several reasons. It can significantly reduce enforcement costs
and time expenditures and promote a more uniform application of the facts, hence
avoiding disparate national judgments.66 But however attractive that may be,
consolidating infringement claims of national patents has its limitations. It is
frequently recognized that questions of registration and validity of patents, which
are routinely counterclaimed in infringement cases, are subject to exclusive
jurisdiction, both adjudicative and prescriptive, to each country where a patent has
been granted. 67 Furthermore, while a single court will arguably be in a better
position than diverse and isolated courts to recognize potential conflicting contacts
and interests between jurisdictions,68 patent rights continue to remain divided as
a matter of law.
D. Procedural Harmonization Through a Choice of Law Approach
Another potential recourse that has been considered in an effort to resolve
substantive discrepancies between the application of separate, national
intellectual property statutes is a choice of law approach. The idea has been that,
instead of having to apply multiple and potentially conflicting statutes, substantive
gaps would in practice become harmonized through applying only a single law, as
determined by the connecting factors associated with the choice of law rule. This
new approach has gained the most popularity amongst academic reforms. Most
notable are the Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (“CLIP
Principles”)69 and the American Law Institute Principles (“ALI Principles”).70 Both
of these bodies of rules stipulate that for ubiquitous infringements, such as
infringements occurring on the internet, courts may apply a single law.71 Both the
CLIP Principles and the ALI Principles propose that if the infringement takes place
in every state in which the signals can be received, then the court may apply the
63 Lucasfilm Ltd. and Others v. Ainsworth and another, [2011] United Kingdom Supreme
Court, UKSC 39, [2012] 1 A.C. 208, 237, 243 (U.K.). However, more recently the Supreme Court
appears to have withdrawn from this stance in Unwired Planet when it said that “[i]f the
judgments of the English courts had purported to rule on the validity or infringement of a foreign
patent, that would indeed be beyond their jurisdiction.” (emphasis added). See Unwired Planet
International Ltd. and another v. Huawei Technologies (U.K.) Co. Ltd. and another, [2020] United
Kingdom Supreme Court, UKSC 37, para. 63 (U.K.).
64 Flava/Erdgold, German Federal Court of Justice, 1957, I ZR 9/54 GRUR 215, 218 (Ger.).
65 Fujimoto v. Neuron Co. Ltd. (‘Card Reader’), [S.Ct. of Japan], 2002, Minshu Vol. 56, No. 7,
1551 (Japan); Coral Sand, [Tokyo D. C.], 2003 1847 Hanrei Jihō (Japan).
66 See Kendra Robins, Extraterritorial Patent Enforcement and Multinational Patent
Litigation: Proposed Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1296–97 (2007).
67 See Article 24(4) of the Recast Brussels I Regulation 1215/2012/EU and Case C-4/03,
Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs
KG, EU:C:2006:457, paras. 22–24; Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 899, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
68 Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 620.
69 Max Planck Institute Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, 2011
[hereinafter CLIP Principles].
70 American Law Institute Intellectual Property Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of
Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes, 2008 [hereinafter ALI Principles].
71 Other known proposals for reform are the Transparency Proposal on Jurisdiction, Choice
of Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Intellectual Property, 2009, and
the Waseda Principles of Private International Law on Intellectual Property Rights, 2010.
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law of the state having the closest connection.72 To determine which state has the
closest connection with the infringement, the CLIP Principles state that all
relevant factors shall be taken into account, including the infringer’s habitual
residence and place of business, the place where substantial activities in
furtherance of the infringement were carried out, and the place where the harm is
substantial in relation to the infringement.73 On rare occasions, lower courts have
referred to these academic reforms in decisions,74 but in general courts have
persisted in adhering to traditional rules of choice of law in intellectual property
cases. The most practiced tradition is lex loci protectionis, which mandates an
application of the law of the country where it is claimed that an infringement is
occurring.75 But even if we would in theory accept that only a single law applies, it
must still be considered whether an infringement substantively occurs in each
country. If the infringement spans multiple jurisdictions, and if we adhere to the
restrictive covenant of territoriality as recognized above, the result would be that
there is no infringement, and so the loophole would still roam openly.
E. The Devolution of Territoriality and Evolution of Extraterritoriality in Patent
Law
1. Localization as the Real Problem Behind Territoriality
It has never been doubted that an infringement of an intellectual property
right can only occur in the country of protection. Since that right only exists in each
country, as a legal construction dictated by national law, it cannot by definition
afford protection anywhere else. This is the real and very logical consequence of
the territorial limitation of intellectual property rights.76 However, unlike what the
strict territorial approach suggests, it is commonly recognized that the principle of
territoriality does not in itself bar taking facts into account which have occurred
abroad, but which have legal significance.77 A cross-border infringement is
CLIP Principles, Article 3:603(1); ALI Principles, Article 321(1).
CLIP Principles, at Art. 3:603(2).
74 See Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F.
Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D. Me. 2008); City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296,
337–38 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Rundquist v. Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 132 (D.D.C. 2011).
75 See Recital (26) and Article 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation 864/2007/EC; Lydia Lundstedt,
TERRITORIALITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 297–304, 326–28 (Ph.D. dissertation,
Stockholm University, 2016); Rita Matulionytė, Law Applicable to Copyright: A Comparison of
the ALI and CLIP Proposals, 28–43 (2011); Sophie Neumann, Ubiquitous and Multistate Cases,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 506
(Paul Torremans ed., 2014) (with further references).
76 Alexander Peukert, Territoriality and Extra-territoriality in Intellectual Property Law, in
BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 189
(Handl et al. ed., 2012); Eugen Ulmer, General Questions–the International Conventions, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Volume XIV, Copyright 5 (Eugen Ulmer
& Gerhard Schricker ed., 2007); Basedow, supra note 22, at 8; Marketa Trimble, Advancing
National Intellectual Property Policies in a Transnational Context, 74 MD . L. REV. 203, 231 (2015).
77 Peukert, supra note 76, at 198–202; Alexander von Mühlendahl & Dieter Stauder,
Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in a Global Economy–Transit and Other “Free Zones,” in
PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: LIBER AMICORUM JOSEPH
STRAUS 654 (Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. ed., 2009); Roberto Romandini & Alexander
Klicznik, The Territoriality Principle and Transnational Use of Patented Inventions–The Wider
Reach of a Unitary Patent and the Role of the CJEU, 44 IIC 524, 530 (2013); Peter Mankowski,
Article 5, BRUSSELS I REGULATION, EUROPEAN COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Volume I 201 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski ed., 2007).
72
73
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precisely a distribution of such facts spanning over multiple jurisdictions. Then,
the question is whether those activities are sufficient to conclude that an
infringement has occurred in a particular country of protection, also known as
localization.
Localizing infringing activities in cross-border situations is not an optional
recourse. It is through localizing the infringement that we understand which laws
it shall surrender to, and in turn which national patent is implicated. Indeed, the
current and most practiced choice of law rule in intellectual property law, lex loci
protectionis, makes the localization of the infringement a necessary ingredient to
the choice of law analysis. Even if it is recognized that lex loci protectionis on its
face mandates an application of the law of the country where a claimed
infringement is alleged to occur,78 it of course becomes essential in practice to
analyze where the infringement is occurring as a matter of fact and law. If
protection is claimed in one country but infringement occurs in another, no
infringement will occur in the country in which laws are subject to application,
thus resulting in the subsequent dismissal of the case on the merits. The country
where infringement is asserted to occur and the country which laws are applicable
must therefore coincide, if we are adhering to lex loci protectionis as the choice of
law rule.
The above contrasts with the presumption in the United States that patent
statutes should not operate extraterritoriality absent clear and affirmative
evidence. The enduring legitimacy of that presumption must be scrutinized and
defined. There are several justifications that have been raised in favor of the
presumption against extraterritoriality. These include, amongst others, a respect
for foreign sovereignty and a desire to avoid policies liable to result in controversies
of the application of international law.79 To be sure, these concerns are not unique
to the United States, but echo in public international law. As recognized by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in Island of Palmas, and as mentioned above, the
legal fact that states are independent and sovereign implies a duty to recognize
those territorial limits of other states.80 But as was also pronounced in S.S. Lotus,
this duty of respect must be distinguished from when there actually is a basis for
jurisdiction.81 Such basis is again foremost found in the territorial connection
between the facts and the state. While the presumption against extraterritoriality
serves the same overall purpose in delimiting jurisdictional scope, it is overly broad
and formulaic in its application by inhibiting courts from exercising prescriptive
jurisdiction when Congress has failed to act.82
78 See Matulionytė, supra note 75, at 59–61; Katharina de la Durantaye, Article 8
Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, in ROME REGULATIONS: COMMENTARY ON THE
EUROPEAN RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 634 (Gralf-Peter Calliess ed., 2015); Jürgen
Basedow, Article 3:102: Lex Protectionis, EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE CLIP
PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY 232 (2013); Martin Illmer, Article 8: Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights, in ROME II REGULATION: POCKET COMMENTARY 241–42 (Peter Huber ed., 2011);
Lundstedt, supra note 75, at 326–27.
79 The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812); Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 514–15 (1997); Zachary
D. Clopton, Extraterritoriality and Extranationality: A Comparative Study, 23 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 217, 232–33 (2013).
80 2 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 829, 838–39 (1928).
81 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 18–19.
82 For criticism of the presumption, see Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11, 16–20 (2014); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:
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Regardless of its blunt design, it continues to be unclear how the
presumption against extraterritoriality should be applied to patent infringement. 83
An act of infringement and an effect resulting from that act are both necessary
ingredients for the same conduct. Similarly, all elements in a patent claim are
necessary to be fulfilled. The question is whether the presence of either is sufficient
to be considered relevant to the statute’s “focus” and thus constitutes an
infringement within the United States, even if one or the other occurred elsewhere.
But the previous United States Supreme Court decisions do not even make it far.
They merely comment on whether or not a congressional intent can be inferred
from the square language of the Patent Act, 84 and already there the test fails. There
is seemingly no appreciation that infringing activities are increasingly spilling over
multiple jurisdictions rather than being fully confined to a specific country. But
most importantly, it disregards that the territorial limitation of patent rights does
not as such prohibit taking into account facts with a foreign locus when concluding
whether there is an infringement or not. Whether this is to be labeled as a form of
extraterritorial application or as merely “regular” localization is, or at least should
be, irrelevant.
It stands to reason that if we would set aside all situations where a part of
the infringing activities has occurred in another country, then right holders would
be seriously deprived of effective and uniform protection. Meanwhile, potential
infringers would benefit from offshoring their actions, placing them at a
competitive advantage over domestic actors who rely on licensing, and of course
the right holder having to recoup investments. This would arguably create a legal
rift between national markets and disincentivize right holders from seeking
protection for subject matter which can easily be exported abroad. It thus seems
very natural, or even absolutely necessary, to consider foreign facts in assessing
infringements.
2. Extraterritoriality as an Instrument of Protectionism Against Globalization
Territoriality in patent law is in decline. Even if patents remain territorial
rights, it is becoming increasingly recognized that an absolute and strict territorial
approach is unfeasible in the face of globalization. 85 The act of localizing
infringements provides courts with the legal tools to discreetly revise that.
Whether or not prescriptive jurisdiction can be assumed essentially boils down to
a semantic question of how much conduct, or what type of conduct, is enough to
consider that an infringement can be localized to a particular jurisdiction. There is
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 217–19 (1991); John H.
Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. I NT’L L. 351, 380 (2010).
83 See Timothy R. Holbrook, What Counts As Extraterritorial in Patent Law?, 25 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 291, 318–19 (2019).
84 That can in part be explained for the decisions preceding Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 244, which was the first decision to discuss the “focus” test.
85 See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2162–63; Wasserman, supra note 8, at 292–94; John W.
Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary for Determination of Infringement by ExtraterritoriallyDistributed Systems, 46 IDEA 587, 588 (2006); Cameron Hutchison & Moin A. Yahya,
Infringement & the International Reach of U.S. Patent Law, 17 F ED. CIR. B.J. 241, 241–43 (2008);
Igor Gliha, Negotiations on the Accession to the EU and the Harmonization of Intellectual Property
with the acquis communautaire in Light of Globalization, PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 601 (Josef Drexl et al. ed., 2009); Peukert, supra note 76, at
200–03; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The
Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 768–71 (2009); Chisum, supra note 20, at
616; Trimble, supra note 1, at 13–17.
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a growing trend in many jurisdictions towards engaging in what are more farreaching practices of localization, which serve to protect the patent holder from
suffering as a result of substantive discrepancies between different countries
implicated in cross-border contexts. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense
that, if it is indeed deemed that an infringement can be localized to a particular
country of protection, then there is no legal threat, based on the description
provided above, to territoriality.86 If considered from that perspective, the decline
of territoriality that is being witnessed is indeed responsible for its own demise.
The process of localizing infringements can essentially be grouped into
inbound and outbound regulation. Inbound regulation concerns when right holders
are protected from spillover effects resulting from conduct that originates from
abroad. Outbound regulation, on the other hand, concerns when right holders are
protected against conduct occurring in whole or in part in other countries. While
this is not a formal legal distinction, it helps categorize different types of
extraterritorial applications,87 which can be either more or less susceptible to
interfere with foreign interests.
Patent infringement can be subject to inbound regulation when goods or
services incorporating the invention are offered for sale, sold, or imported in the
country of protection, even if the foreign act that is subject to such conduct occurs
in a country where there is no infringement. This is foremost a matter of statutory
construction, particularly what connecting factors should be deemed relevant and
sufficient and what interests should be considered in that regard. Courts in
Germany,88 the Netherlands,89 and France 90 have found that there is patent
infringement through putting on the market and offering for sale when the
infringing goods are made available to actual customers in the forum through
arranged transportation, even if the act of offering takes place elsewhere.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit has held that an offer made abroad to sell goods
incorporating the invention within the United States will amount to patent
infringement.91 The localization of the act of offering in this regard is not dependent
on that there is an agreement made within the forum under a contract law
analysis.92 Rather, it is the offer or sale to actual customers in the destined forum,
hence expressing the intent of consummating the sale there, that is deemed a
sufficient territorial connection.93
The situation is different where the act of offering is not limited to actual
customers, but instead where the allegedly infringing goods are made available on
Moufang, supra note 1, at 604; Peukert, supra note 76, at 200–03.
For a discussion of this distinction, see Peukert, supra note 76, at 203, 210; AMIRAM
BENYAMINI, PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 240 (1993).
88 Funkuhr, German Federal Court of Justice, 2003, IIC 2003, 34(4), 432, X ZR 36/01 (Ger.).
89 Probel v. Parke Davis, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, [1964] NJ 1372, No. 494 (Neth.).
90 Water Corp. v. Agilent Techs. Deutschland, Paris Court of Appeal, [October 5, 2011]
09/02423 (Fr.).
91 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
92 This is not the case in all countries. For instance, in the United Kingdom there can be no
patent infringement through disposition of goods unless title is passed to the buyer while within
the forum. See Kalman v. PCL Packaging (U.K.) Ltd., [1982] England and Wales High Court,
F.S.R. 406 (U.K.).
93 Similarly, but outside patent law, the European Court of Justice has ruled that a copyright
and trademark holder is afforded protection under the customs regulation for online sales at the
time when those goods enter the territory of a Member State by virtue of acquisition of those
goods. It is not necessary in this regard to inquire whether those goods were subject to an offer
for sale targeting that Member State. See Case C-98/13, Martin Blomqvist v. Rolex SA,
EU:C:2014:55, paras. 30–35.
86
87
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the internet for anyone to purchase. In these cases, there are an unlimited number
of recipients residing in different jurisdictions. If accessibility would be a sufficient
connecting factor, then there would potentially be a significant number of
competing infringement or non-infringement claims to a single act. This calls for a
need to limit what jurisdictions that an act of infringement should be subject to.
Although there have been attempts to resolve this issue of concurrent jurisdiction
through choice of law rules, as has been mentioned above, the most common
approach adopted by courts has instead been to opt for more narrow connecting
factors. In particular, outside the patent context, the European Court of Justice
has considered that the mere accessibility of infringing content online is
insufficient to amount to infringement94 but sufficient to establish adjudicative
jurisdiction,95 and that the substantive test should rather be whether the
infringing activities online are targeted to customers within a particular country
of protection. Relevant factors to determine whether customers are targeted have
varied from the language, appearance and content of the website, the nature and
size of the business, the characteristics of the goods or services at issue, the content
and distribution channels of advertising materials, the number of domestic visitors
to the website, and partnerships with shipping companies.96 To that end, the
European Court of Justice held in L’Oréal v. eBay that there “must” be trademark
infringement when trademark-protected goods are offered for sale from a third
state to consumers but targeted at consumers in the country of protection, as
otherwise the effectiveness of such laws would be impaired.97 In the United States,
the situation is in part the reverse, where mere accessibility is not enough to
establish personal jurisdiction,98 and where inconsistent results have been reached
on how to measure when internet use is sufficient to amount to an infringement. 99

94 Case C‑324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, EU:C:2011:474, paras. 61–67 (the mere fact that a website
is accessible from the country of protection is not a sufficient basis for concluding that offers for
sale displayed there are targeted at consumers in that territory); Case C‑173/11, Football Dataco
v. Sportradar, EU:C:2012:642, paras. 27–47 (accessibility of website is insufficient for performing
an act of re-utilization under the sui generis right in Member States). See also Case C-5/11,
Donner, EU:C:2012:370, paras. 26–30; Case C-516/13, Dimensione Direct Sales, EU:C:2015:315,
paras. 28–35.
95 Case C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech, EU:C:2013:635, paras. 42–47 (courts in
Member States from which a website containing copyright infringing material is accessible
possess adjudicative jurisdiction on the basis that damage resulting from the alleged
infringement may occur there). See also Case C-441/13, Pez Hejduk v. EnergieAgentur.NRW,
EU:C:2015:28, paras. 29–38.
96 See Case C-5/11, Donner, EU:C:2012:370, para. 29; Merck KGaA v. Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp, [2017] England and Wales Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1834 at 170 (U.K.) (also
distinguishing between objective or subjective intentions and considering that both can be
relevant in assessing jurisdictional targeting).
97 Case C‑324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, EU:C:2011:474, paras. 61–62.
98 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 715–16 (4th Cir. 2002) (mere
accessibility of website alleged to contain copyright infringing material is insufficient for personal
jurisdiction); Toys R Us, Inc. v. Step Two, 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3rd Cir. 2003) (denying personal
jurisdiction in a trademark infringement case over a website in Spanish).
99 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153–54 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding
no copyright infringement where it was argued that images hosted on Russian servers could still
be downloaded in the United States); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Conus Communications Co. Ltd.
P’ship, 969 F. Supp. 579, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding copyright infringement where broadcasts
were received and viewed within the United States, even if the reception was unintended);
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. CIV. A. 00-120, 2000 WL 255989, at *7–9
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000) (finding copyright infringement where protected works were made
accessible on a streaming website from Canada, even if only Canadian viewers were the intended
recipients); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641–43 (2d Cir. 1956) (use of a
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Although these principles have largely received little attention in patent cases, the
underlying concerns remain the essentially same. There is a need to single out
contacts having sufficient effects within the forum that compete with the interests
of the right holder. Infringement should not be avoided simply by relocating some
of the contested activities, while still gaining the benefits of competition in the
domestic market.
The still unresolved problem, however, is that conduct on the internet is
more often than not geographically neutral, making content available to anyone
and with little guidance as to who is the intended recipient. Moreover, the precise
scope of the targeting doctrine is far from clear. There are no established criteria
for what constitutes targeting,100 and even the most common factors such as
language and advertising are becoming increasingly inadequate proxies for
whether a particular audience in a specific country is intended or not. This is
particularly the case for languages turning into lingua franca and for
advertisements that are outsourced and automatically generated depending on
personal data. There is a risk that, when no countries are targeted specifically, all
countries will be in a position to assume prescriptive jurisdiction. 101
Another form of inbound regulation becomes relevant when only some
parts of the invention are used in the country of protection. Because what
constitutes “use” of an invention is inseparable from what is the scope of the
invention, as will later be explored in more detail,102 this form of extraterritorial
application resolves both around a statutory construction and construction of the
patent claim. Where the Federal Circuit failed in NTP (II) to find infringement
when a method was performed across borders, other courts have reached opposite
results. In Menashe Business Mercantile Ltd v. William Hill Org. Ltd, the English
and Wales Court of Appeal was tasked with answering whether a claimed gaming
system was “used” and “put into effect” within the United Kingdom where the host
computer was located elsewhere.103 The Court found that it did not matter for the
purpose of indirect infringement where the computer was located, even if it was
part of the disputed claim, as its location was deemed “not important to the user of
the invention nor to the claimed gaming system.”104 The Court refused to consider
it pertinent to consider for the purpose of localization whether there was an effect
within the United Kingdom, which was considered to have no legal basis. 105
Instead, what was considered relevant was who used the gaming system and
where. The Court then opted for locating the infringing use where the user was
located, which was in the United Kingdom.106 The host computer located abroad
was, from that perspective, deemed to be used, and then also put into effect, within
the United Kingdom.107
mark requires a substantial effect on commerce within the United States to amount to trademark
infringement).
100 In the copyright context, see Rita Matulionytė, Enforcing Copyright Infringements Online:
In Search of Balanced Private International Law Rules, 6 JIPITEC 132, 136 (2015). For more
generally, see Thomas Schultz, Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders and the
Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 E.J.I.L. 799, 818 (2008).
101 See Matulionytė, supra note 100, at 136–37.
102 See infra Section V(B)(1)(a).
103 Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., [2002] England and Wales Court
of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1702.
104 Id. at 32.
105 Id. at 28.
106 Id. at 33.
107 Id. See also Research in Motion U.K. Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., [2010] England and Wales High
Court, EWHC 118 (Pat) at 156 (a method patent of operating a messaging gateway system not

[21:358:2021]

Closing the Patent Loophole Across Borders

375

In the German case Prepaid-Karten II, the Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf
also found that there was direct infringement of a method claim in cross-border
circumstances.108 The claim extended to the processing of telephone calls, where
all steps but one – the offering of prepaid telephone cards – were performed outside
Germany. However, since all commands generated by the server were
subsequently transferred to Germany, it was deemed that the actions were
purposefully intended to have an effect, in the economic sense, in Germany.109
There was then an intended commercial advantage from the defendant that was
targeted at the forum, which was sufficient to justify a finding of infringing use.110
Although using a different rationale, the German Federal Court of Justice has also
considered in Rohrschweissverfahren that there was direct patent infringement in
Germany if the final steps claimed in a method patent were finalized there, even if
other steps were performed elsewhere.111 The patent concerned the making of a
data carrier with welding data and then using the data on the data carrier in a
manufacturing process.112 The Court held that, in such a case where there are
multiple process steps, the user of the data carrier was also deemed to use the
process, and take advantage of all the features, if the welding process was carried
out using the stored welding data.113
Some courts in the United States have likewise found, even if
inconsistently, that there can be patent infringement even though not all claim
elements have been performed within the United States. In Decca, Ltd. v. United
States, the United States Court of Claims found that a system claim involving a
radio navigation system was infringed even if one of the transmitting stations, as
part of the claim, was located outside the United States.114 Since the equipment
abroad was still owned and “controlled” by the defendant, and since the “actual
beneficial use” of the system was domestic, it was held that there was direct patent
infringement.115 The United States Court of Claims also raised the relevance of
where the substance of the invention was carried, which has later been phrased as
the “patently distinctive” test.116 Several decades later, and as already mentioned,
the Federal Circuit followed this same approach in NTP (II) when localizing a
remote e-mailing system to where the users were located in the United States. The
Court held that the users were in the actual control of transmitting information
and also benefitted from the exchange of information. 117 Even if a necessary
component in the system was located elsewhere, it was thus deemed that the use
of the communication system as a whole occurred in the United States. 118 But as
also mentioned earlier, the Court refused to depart from a territorial requirement
deemed infringed, assuming that claim was construed so as to refer to the use of a server, and the
location of that server was abroad).
108 Prepaid-Karten II, Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf, Dec. 10, 2009, 2 U 51/08 (Ger.).
109 Id.
110 Id. A similar focus on the deprivation of economic rights have been proposed by some
commentators in the United States. See Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 32, at 54–56; Rex W.
Miller, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why Economic Interests Rather than
Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST . L.J. 403, 442–50 (2009).
111 Rohrschweissverfahren, German Federal Court of Justice, Feb. 24, 2007, X ZR 113/04
(Ger.).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1075 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
115 Id. at 1083.
116 Cf. Osborne, supra note 85, at 593.
117 NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1317.
118 Id.
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linked to the all elements rule of an equivalent method claim in the same patent,
and hence considered that the claim was not infringed.119
Whereas inbound regulation is more concerned with protecting right
holders from conduct originating from abroad, and which more concretely has an
effect within the forum, outbound regulation is rather focused on protecting right
holders abroad. Unsurprisingly, there are far fewer cases concerning outbound
regulation as regulating states are less impacted as opposed to other states. One
form of outbound regulation is when goods or services incorporating the invention
originate from the country of protection and are subsequently offered for sale, sold,
or exported abroad. In most jurisdictions, exportation is not an exclusive right that
expressly belongs to the patent holder,120 but this does not suggest that exportation
can never infringe. Instead of infringing under an exportation right, the essentially
same form of conduct can be caught as an offer for sale, if unconsummated, or a
sale. There are some cases supporting that an offer for sale or sale can be localized
both at the place of where the intended recipient is and at the place of offer or
transmission. Localizing an offer for sale or sale at the latter place means that
liability is incurred in a similar fashion for commercial conduct consummated
abroad, even if there would be no infringement in that country. To exemplify,
German121 and Swedish122 courts have found for infringement where an offer is
made domestically, notwithstanding that the infringing goods were never present
within the territory and that the intended sale was targeted elsewhere.123
Outbound regulation also extends to the situation considered in Deepsouth,
where individually unpatented components are made within the forum to be
shipped and compiled abroad. In several jurisdictions, such as Germany 124 and the
United Kingdom,125 this will result in indirect patent infringement only if the
completed product is subsequently intended to be used in the forum. There is in
that sense a double territorial requirement.126 German courts have also refused to
extend direct patent infringement liability in cases where only individual
components are manufactured domestically, as all claim elements are not fulfilled
in that case.127
A similar situation arises where results from a patented process are offered
or sold within the country of protection, but where the actual process is performed
elsewhere. This was more recently in the spotlight in the case of non-invasive
Id. at 1317–18.
Lundstedt, supra note 75, at 508–09.
121 Kreuzbodenventilsäcke, German Federal Court of Justice, 1960 GRUR 423, I ZR 109/58
(Ger.).
122 Case T 1253/89, Dec. 12, 1990, Svea Court of Appeals (Swed.).
123 A more restrictive approach has been taken in the United Kingdom and in the United
States by requiring that the final sale must occur within its territory to amount to infringement,
see Kalman v. PCL Packaging (U.K.) Ltd., [1982] England and Wales High Court, F.S.R. 406
(U.K.); Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
124 Funkuhr II, German Federal Court of Justice, IIC 2007, 38(5), 607, X ZR 53/04 (Ger.). The
same Court has, however, subsequently found that there is contributory patent infringement even
if the components are supplied from abroad, see Audiosignalcodierung, German Federal Court of
Justice, 2015 GRUR 467, X ZR 69/13 (Ger.).
125 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. Delta Airways, Inc., [2010] England and Wales High
Court, EWHC 3094 (Pat) at 89 (U.K.).
126 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2021) stipulates a different test in cases of supplying components in or
from the United States which are used for the purpose of the invention. There is no double
territorial requirement, but instead a hypothetical exercise of whether the combination of the
components would infringe the patent if such combination occurred in the United States.
127 Flügelradzähler, German Federal Court of Justice, 2004 GRUR 758, X ZR 48/03 (Ger.).
119
120
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prenatal test methods in Illumina, Inc v. Premaitha Health Plc. After the England
and Wales High Court had found for direct infringement when the diagnostic test
was performed within the United Kingdom, the defendants sought a declaration of
non-infringement for a different scenario.128 In this envisioned scenario, blood
samples would be sourced from the forum and subsequently shipped to countries
where no protection existed for testing purposes, after which test results would be
provided to customers in the forum.129 Since the method itself was not carried out
in the country of protection, the question of infringement largely turned on whether
it was still deemed to be offered for use there. The Court answered affirmatively,
even if the statutory language limited both use and offers of processes to the United
Kingdom.130 In finding hypothetically for direct infringement, the Court reasoned
that the “substance” of the method was still performed within the country as the
blood used for testing was taken there and since preparatory technical steps were
made there for what was already a pre-determined method performed abroad. 131
The Court explicitly held, while referring to Menashe, that “any other result would
make it far too easy to avoid infringement of patents of this nature, given the ease
of digital transmission and the ability to off-shore computer processing.”132
The above suggests that, on the one hand, the localization of cross-border
conduct is a necessary element of any patent infringement analysis. It serves to
avoid legal loopholes, whether through inbound or outbound regulation, and thus
seeks to preserve the efficacy of patent protection in cross-border situations. But
on the other hand, it is far from clear what factors should be taken into account in
this context. Territoriality is a relative and not a fixed term, and a colorable
argument can often be made on either side of the spectrum.133 Different courts
apply different criteria, with some focusing on statutory or claim language, and
others focusing on establishing connecting factors on the basis of the infringing
acts themselves, their effects, or the patented subject matter. The interests of the
right holder are taken into account as a related factor, or sometimes as the sole
factor. There is in this context a glaring absence of considering other competing
objectives, in particular those afforded to the public in other jurisdictions and
foreign states themselves. While the referred cases demonstrate that courts are
recognizing that a strict territorial approach is no longer sustainable, the recent
surge of extraterritoriality is still worrisome in that there is a risk that
protectionism goes too far.

128 Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and Wales High Court, EWHC
2930 (Pat) at 507–08 (U.K.).
129 Id. at 503–04.
130 Id. at 507–08.
131 Id. at 507.
132 Id. at 508. This contrasts to the Bayer case in the United States, where the alleged
infringer had practiced screening methods abroad but subsequently imported information obtain
from those methods into the United States for use in developing drugs. The Federal Circuit was
there tasked with whether 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which covers infringement by use of products made
by a patented process, extended to that situation. The Court answered negatively and based its
reasoning largely on a formulaic reading of the statute, see Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340
F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
133 See Marketa Trimble, Territorial Discrepancy Between Intellectual Property Rights
Infringement Claims and Remedies, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 501, 511 (2018); Neumann, supra
note 75, at 521–22; Paul Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and
Ownership Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 315, 335–36 (2004) (suggesting how the
localization analysis can easily be framed to capture a particular infringing conduct depending
on the context).
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IV. DEFINING THE CRITERIA FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT
INFRINGEMENT
The above-mentioned lack of consistency in patent enforcement in
cross-border cases is problematic as it fuels ambivalence and uncertainty. Parties
are frustrated in calculating legal risks as courts jump from one proposition to
another in different legal and factual settings, with no apparent coherent line of
reasoning or authority. Underlying these disparate results are competing theories
for how issues of territoriality and extraterritoriality should be approached. On the
one hand, there is a concern about safeguarding the efficacy of patent protection in
cross-border cases. On the other hand, always maintaining that can come at the
cost of predictability and uniformity while imposing a risk of implicating foreign
sovereignty. So far, courts have tended to treat this as a black and white issue,
approaching it from a single or too rigid angle. But in order to settle the matter,
there is a need to approach the issue holistically and understand how these
struggling interests interact with one another. The task ahead, therefore, lies in
defining and distinguishing what are the overarching theories that underpin
extraterritorial enforcement of patent infringement, and in doing so establish the
basis for what is the criteria for its resolution.
A. Sovereignty
The most fundamental interest manifested in cross-border situations is
sovereignty. Even if there is sufficient nexus that constitutes a jurisdictional basis,
the exercise of that jurisdiction must not interfere in the exercise of law within
another state.134 Sovereignty is not a one-sided concept, and as Professor
Dinwoodie has phrased it “the purest act of sovereignty is to foreswear from acting
in circumstances in which it is descriptively and prescriptively possible to do so.” 135
Hence, even supposing there is a sufficient basis for localizing an infringement to
the country of protection, there is a need to consider how that has the potential of
implicating foreign sovereignty.
If we start with the first and most far-reaching starting point, it becomes
relevant to directly investigate and consider the illegality of the adjudicated
conduct under the laws of those countries that are implicated by that same
conduct.136 That is to say if cross-border conduct has sufficient nexus to countries
A, B, and C, and is subject to suit for infringement in A and B but not C, we should
consider what consequences adjudication of infringement in countries A and B has
for each other and for C. This would then become a three-step exercise. First, we
identify what are the territorial connections to which countries and conclude
whether those countries have prescriptive jurisdiction under national law. Second,
we compare the substantive results under each national law to see if there are
appreciable differences for whether there is infringement or not. There is a high
degree of variability of what differences could arise, though the most common
134 Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 829, 838–39
(1928); Ryngaert, supra note 23, at 40; Mann (1964), supra note 23, at 30.
135 Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 773.
136 Similar approaches have been proposed by commentators, see Holbrook, supra note 1, at
2163–66 (proposing a dual patent infringement approach similar to the dual criminality
principle); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 561–69 (2000) (proposing a substantive law approach in
copyright cases, which takes into account foreign interests while allowing for compromises in
remedies).
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differences to be expected concern patentability criteria, infringement standards,
exceptions and limitations, and of course that foreign courts have already reached
a different substantive result of the same dispute. The fact that no patent has been
procured abroad by the plaintiff should not be considered a sovereign interest but
can impose private concerns.137 Third, we evaluate how conduct in implicated
countries would be affected from adjudicating the alleged infringement as a result
of those identified substantive differences.
The suggested method above assumes that legal conflicts should be the
focus of the comparative exercise. This is, however, arguably a simplistic
assumption as foreign interests can be affected even if the legal situation is
identical. In particular, there may be adverse offshore private or public effects
resulting from adjudicating the infringement. An example would be if the product
or service in dispute is digital and therefore accessible everywhere, in which case
an injunction in country A would be at risk of implicating countries B and C as
well. If it is not possible to segregate markets when following the injunction, then
this could compel the losing party to discontinue or amend its products or services
everywhere. The successful adjudication in country A would then clearly impact
market conditions or reasons related to public policy prevailing in other
countries.138 Other countries might in turn react to that, for instance by publicly
denouncing such extraterritorial actions or refusing to enforce such foreign
judgments.139
Either of these approaches just provides the structure for the initial
analysis. A greater debate still surrounds how these discrepancies should impact
adjudication. Perhaps the most far-reaching consideration is to treat this
additional factor as cumulative in the sense that it would be placed on the same
level as a territorial requirement. Thus, if there is no infringement abroad where
the conduct is also deemed to occur or if conflicting private or public effects are felt
abroad, then it should neither be an infringement in the relevant country of
protection.140 What is extremist and controversial with this approach is that it is a
form of forced harmonization to the bottom.141 A middle ground would be to, instead
See infra Section IV(E).
Cf. Dreyfuss, supra note 55, at 17–18 (commenting on problems associated with facing
inconsistent national judgments for ubiquitous products or services).
139 An example of foreign intervention in domestic patent litigation is the amicus brief
submitted by Canada in NTP (II), which argued that the decision raised “the risk that Section
271(a) may be accorded inappropriate extraterritorial application, contrary to basic principles of
comity affecting Canada and the United States.” See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of
Canada in Support of the Request for Rehearing En Banc Made in the Combined Petition by
Research in Motion, Ltd. for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1615). Refusals to recognize foreign
judgments are familiar outside the patent context. A well-known example is the Yahoo! litigation,
where Yahoo! was sued in France to take down web pages posting the sale of Nazi memorabilia
which were illegal in France. This resulted in an injunction, even if that post was accessible and
available everywhere. See La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme and l’Union des
Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo Inc! and Yahoo France, [May 22, 2000] High Court of Paris,
(Fr.). The United States District Court of California subsequently refused to enforce the decision
on the ground that it violated the First Amendment, see Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2001). See also Sarl Louis
Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to enforce
a French decision to award damages and injunctive relief for foreign copyright infringement on
the basis of the First Amendment).
140 Holbrook, supra note 1, 2184–85.
141 Courts have even rejected this restrictive notion of respect for their own sovereignty in
the context of enforcement of foreign judgments. See Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc.,
406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that even if a foreign judgment on copyright
137
138
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of treating this as a bare infringement question, treat it as a question of
enforcement where carefully drafted remedies can seek to avoid extraterritorial
effects resulting from the adjudication while still securing effective protection. 142
An even less extreme, but more flexible approach is to merely let this be one of
several factors to consider in a broader interest analysis. Weighing competing
interests, both foreign and domestic, are commonplace in choice of law contexts, in
particular in the United States where federal courts apply the law having the
greatest interest in the litigation.143 Such a broader interest analysis has also been
the selected approach in several academic reforms, such as the CLIP Principles
and ALI Principles referred to above.144
The above suggests that sovereignty as a concept can be considered through
several different lenses, with each approach having its own advantages and
disadvantages. The comparative law method promotes comity and thus avoids
conflicts between laws if possible. It places foreign laws and conditions at an equal
footing with national equivalents and in doing so furthers cooperation, dialogue,
and ultimately the development of international norms.145 But this exercise can be
complex to perform, as it would involve delving into details of foreign material. If
a significant number of countries are implicated in the dispute, then this could
become overwhelming to administer and unduly costly to litigate. Forced
harmonization is also problematic. Unconditional surrender to foreign laws is
obviously too far-reaching, as that would at the same time be a surrender of
national sovereignty, but even weighing substantive discrepancies raises concerns.
As other commentators have phrased it in other contexts, we are losing legal
diversity in technological development, which in turn has consequences for fields
such as education, health, and communication.146 Another major concern that has
been raised is if courts are at all suitable in making these decisions, which involve
weighing sovereign interests.147 Indeed, that the United States Supreme Court has
deferred rulings to Congress in cross-border patent cases can be considered as a
testament to that.148

infringement would be irreconcilable with Unites States law, for instance because of differences
in copyrightability, that “does not mean that a foreign judgment based on a contrary policy
decision is somehow ‘repugnant to the public policies underlying the Copyright Act and trademark
law’.”).
142 Dinwoodie, supra note 136, at 564–65.
143 See In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992). The Ninth
Circuit has also turned to an interest-balancing approach when assuming an extraterritorial
application in antitrust and trademark law. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l
Trust & Say. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (using a series of factors to ascertain whether
interests and links are sufficient to justify an extraterritorial application, such as the degree of
conflict with foreign law or policy, nationality and domicile of the parties, the necessity of foreign
enforcement, the relative significance of foreign and domestic effects and the charged violations,
intention to harm domestic commerce, and foreseeability); Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters.,
Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing the Timberlane factors, id.).
144 See supra Section III(D).
145 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2185–87.
146 Graeme W. Austin, Importing Kazaa Exporting Grokster, 22 SANTA CLARA. COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 577, 595, 610–11 (2006).
147 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2188–89; Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in
International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 461, 462 (1993).
148 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp, 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 456 (2007).
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B. Proximity
Sovereignty is a concept imposing both rights and obligations. The
discussion above surrounds how the respect for foreign sovereignty should be
evaluated in assessing infringement. Proximity, on the other hand, is related to the
nexus to the state which is the legal basis for the state’s right to exercise its own
sovereignty.149 That necessary nexus arises out of the conduct that is subject to
litigation, that is the alleged infringement. As has been described throughout this
article, different courts have applied different criteria to assess what connecting
factors are sufficient to localize an infringement and thus exercise prescriptive
jurisdiction within state borders. When localizing infringing acts falling under the
exclusive rights, courts have either looked at the locus of the act itself or the locus
of its harm or effect, hence mirroring principles of subjective and objective
territoriality. When localizing conduct falling under patent claims, courts have
instead turned to where the “substance” of the invention is used or “controlled” or
where the commercial benefits arising from the use of the invention materialize.
These latter approaches expose similarities to indirect infringement and the
doctrine of equivalents, but with some important exceptions. Localizing the control
or benefits arising from the use of the invention acts as a substitute for the lack of
traditional connecting factors. Indeed, in Illumina, as referred to above, the
England and Wales High Court found direct infringement of a method claim even
if the method was proposed to be performed abroad because the substance of the
invention was related to the material itself that was domestically sourced. 150
A question still unresolved in this regard is if the strength, or even type, of
the connecting factor, should counteract competing foreign sovereign interests,
which may or may not be supported by similar or stronger connecting factors. For
instance, if we return to the above-mentioned example where the product or service
in dispute is digital and thus accessible everywhere, all countries to which there is
sufficient nexus enjoy an equal sovereign share in the infringing conduct. 151 This
could either mean a “free for all” approach, where no country owes any expectation
to respect the interests of others,152 or instead that the universal nature of the
infringement calls for a more cautious approach. The argument submitted in this
article is closer to the latter. Proximity is the starting point of the analysis, but it
is not the end, and other interests such as sovereignty can and should limit its legal
force.153

149 Dariush Keyhani, U.S. Patent Law and Extraterritorial Reach, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 51, 65 (2005).
150 Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and Wales High Court, EWHC
2930 (Pat) at 507–08 (U.K.).
151 Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112–13 (2000)
(phrasing national courts as co-equals in contexts of global litigation).
152 The above-mentioned Yahoo! litigation is one such example, where the French court
issued an injunction to take down the online sale postings on the basis of French law, even if that
was fiercely objected as there was no legitimate reason for French law to take precedence over
other national laws, which were also implicated. See also Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 778.
153 Cf. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2126, 2164; Holbrook, supra note 83, at 317–18 (cautioning
against an extraterritorial application which interferes with foreign sovereignty); Wasserman,
supra note 8, at 306 (proposing that comity concerns should restrict an extraterritorial application
in cross-border patent cases, even if there are sufficient connecting factors to otherwise mandate
prescriptive jurisdiction). See also infra references made in note 259.
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C. Efficacy
A reoccurring theme is maintaining the efficacy of national patent laws in
cross-border contexts. On the one hand, the interest in maintaining strong patent
protection invites greater focus to assert control over foreign conduct which can
adversely impact those interests. There is then an appealing argument to link
efficacy to proximity, stretching connecting factors further out to reach more
offshore activities. On the other hand, efficacy is also invoked as an argument to
drag factors that do not conform to objective or subjective territoriality into the
discussion of extraterritoriality. When there is simply a lack of connecting factors
related to the applicable rule, safeguarding that patent protection is efficacious has
so far been invoked to fill in the gaps.
But how do we define efficacy? Courts having ruled on infringements
occurring in their own forums suggest that efficacy is intrinsically linked to the
applicability of their national intellectual property statutes and that the foreign
conduct exerts an effect on that market. They care about efficacy when there is a
risk that the legal monopoly afforded to the patent holder is becoming diluted;
when the patent holder has to compete with cross-border conduct in its own
territory. The targeting doctrine, as explained in the above-mentioned decisions
from the European Court of Justice,154 and the extraterritorial expansion of method
patents in the Illumina case highlights this almost perfectly. These legal devices
have been justified precisely because they would otherwise, as the England and
Wales High Court phrased it in Illumina, “make it far too easy to avoid
infringement.”155
A problem with efficacy is that it is manipulative. There are, again, no
defined metrics for what territorial connections are sufficient to localize an
infringement, which makes it a hotbed for protectionist interpretations. What
conduct has adverse effects on the exercise of the patent monopoly is similarly
dubious, as courts attempt to interpret vague and open-ended national patent
policies or rely on input from the patent holder. But perhaps the greatest problem
with efficacy is that it is self-centered. It disregards that differences between
national intellectual property laws are a natural phenomenon, as an inherent
consequence of national sovereignty, and so is cross-border conduct in a globalized
world. This raises a number of questions. If the national level of protection that is
subject to enforcement is higher than where the infringing party is alleging it is
acting, we are left with the theoretical challenge as to why a supposedly higher
level of protection should be considered more desirable, and more importantly to
whom. The mere fact that the level of protection is “higher” does not necessarily
mean that it is more legitimate. A way of avoiding this question altogether is to
redefine the problem so that it is not about comparing substantive differences of
national laws, but about merely securing the effective application of national law.
Efficacy then becomes linked to sovereignty and inherits, as a result, its issues in
defining clear criteria and norms as stated above.

154 See Case C‑324/09, L’Oréal v. eBay, EU:C:2011:474, para. 62; Case C‑173/11, Football
Dataco v. Sportradar, EU:C:2012:642, para. 45 (holding that if national law is not applied in
targeting situations, the effectiveness of the protection afforded under national law would be
impaired).
155 Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and Wales High Court, EWHC
2930 (Pat) at 508 (U.K.).
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D. Bad Faith
One potential means of resolving the dilemma of distinguishing legitimate
cross-border practices from what could count as misuse of the international patent
system is to search for an adverse intention that can be attributed to the alleged
infringer. This is not a novel concept in patent enforcement as it has long been a
necessary element in indirect infringement standards. Just like divided
infringement, indirect infringement copes with an incomplete situation of
infringing acts, where no single party performs all constituent elements. National
patent rules on indirect infringement often recognize that someone offering or
supplying components that are essential for carrying out the invention and who
has the knowledge of that such means are suitable and intended for that purpose,
becomes indirectly liable for infringement.156 Indirect infringement illustrates how
intent can be used to distinguish legitimate use of what are separate,
non-infringing parts from acts that purport to utilize the invention. That theory
could, in principle, also be extended to divided patent infringement.157
In practice, a theory of bad faith would target cases where the alleged
infringer is taking steps to partition its conduct in multiple jurisdictions for the
main purpose of avoiding liability.158 The focus is on the intention of exploiting
substantive differences between national laws to gain the advantage of competing
against the patent holder in the country of protection. But what appears to be a
straightforward analysis is in reality much more complex. Again, both differences
between national laws and cross-border conduct are a natural phenomenon. The
reasons for where parties locate parts of their operations can be based on diverse
considerations such as financial, historical, technical, or logistical.159 Legal
considerations can of course also play an important role, but to uncover that could
require substantial discovery, if at all discoverable. With these circumstances in
mind, it becomes much less simple to separate cases of supposed bad faith from
those where there are legitimate cross-border practices.

156 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2021) (“offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent”); The Patents Act, 1977 § 60(2) (U.K.) (“supplies or offers
to supply in the United Kingdom a person other than a licensee or other person entitled to work
the invention with any of the means, relating to an essential element of the invention, for putting
the invention into effect when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the
circumstances, that those means are suitable for putting, and are intended to put, the invention
into effect in the United Kingdom.”); Patentgesetz [German Patent Act] 1980, § 10 (“supplying or
offering to supply, within the territorial scope of this Act, persons other than those entitled to
exploit the patented invention with means relating to an essential element of the invention for
use within the territorial scope of this Act if the third party knows or if it is obvious from the
circumstances that those means are suitable and intended for using that invention.”); 特許法
Tokkyohō [Japanese Patent Act] 1959, Article 101(i)(iv) (“Where a patent has been granted for an
invention of a product [or process], acts of producing, assigning, etc., importing or offering for
assignment, etc. any product to be used exclusively for the producing of the said product [or
process] as a business.”).
157 Cf. Lee, supra note 1, at 367 (describing how indirect infringement could provide some
protection in cases of cross-border partial uses of inventions).
158 Cf. Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2183; Wasserman, supra note 8, at 306.
159 Marketa Trimble, The Multiplicity of Copyright Laws on the Internet, 25 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 339, 360 (2015).
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E. Contributory Fault
In some cases, there is no infringement in a specific country not because of
substantive differences between national laws, but simply because the patent
holder has no patent there. The comparative law approach, as has been suggested
above, would mandate precisely a comparison between different national laws to
see whether there is infringement or not abroad before adjudicating the same
substantive question in the forum at issue. The focus from that perspective is to
avoid potential encroachments upon foreign sovereignty. But when we are faced
with non-infringement because of the failure to hold a patent abroad, that issue
instead turns on a question of contributory fault. It is essentially asking, analogous
to tort law, if part of the blame should be attributed to the patent holder. This is a
complex question as reasons for not having a patent in a specific jurisdiction can
be diverse.
Patent holders tend to selectively apply for patent protection in those
countries where there is a substantial, viable market, leaving the rest open for
competition. It would seem unrealistic, as other commentators have said,160 to
require patent protection in all the countries of interest before allowing an
extraterritorial application. Another common situation is where the patent holder
has been unsuccessful in procuring patent protection or where the patent has been
invalidated. In this case, it is more arguable that an extraterritorial application
would unduly encroach upon foreign sovereignty, as foreign policy reasons for
rejecting protection should be respected and not be circumvented through
extraterritoriality.161 A more rare but still possible scenario is where someone else
has procured a patent, causing a conflict in ownership, which also suggests a more
cautious approach to avoid cases of potentially double liability.162
F. Predictability
Lack of predictability in patent law can adversely impact international
trade, business strategies, and technological development. If it is known that
regulation of divided infringement is subject to loopholes, then patent holders
might be more inclined to apply for patent protection in a larger number of
countries, even if the intention is only limited to block out competitors from
offshoring their operations. This would obstruct not just international trade to the
potential detriment of the patent holder, but would also preclude third parties from
utilizing technology in what would otherwise be a free, but now frozen, market.
More than two decades ago, Professor Chisum expressed concerns over that “the
increasing interdependence of the global economy and the growing concern over
the cost of multinational intellectual property rights procurement and
enforcement . . . will make territorialism an unacceptable obstacle to international
trade.”163 If extraterritoriality is weakened or is uncertain, and if there is, in turn,
increased reliance on conventional, territorial enforcement mechanisms on a
country-by-country basis, those costs and obstacles will rise even further to

Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2176.
Id. at 2177. See also Robins, supra note 66, at 1312.
162 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2177.
163 Chisum, supra note 20, at 616.
160
161
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unacceptable levels.164 This may in practice threaten to exclude participants with
lesser financial capabilities.165
As another adverse response to a decline in predictability, patent holders
might attempt to narrow their conduct and draft claims that are less capable of
being practiced at divided stages, which poses a risk for partitioning markets. Such
partitioning can of course also occur from the user side. If there is instead a looming
threat of extraterritoriality in a specific technical field, users have a clear incentive
to relocate business operations where the risk of cross-border enforcement is the
least.166 There is a further and important link between predictability and fairness.
An essential element of fairness in law is to give due notice in what rights and
obligations exist. The ex-post finding of infringement on the basis of a far-reaching
extraterritorial application could arguably be considered unfair, as the implicated
parties would not have had a chance to preemptively act upon a given warning and
prevent the purported harm.167
Perhaps the most noticeable and direct consequence of less predictability
is a surge in domestic patent litigation. Patent holders are highly reluctant to
gamble outcomes and significant legal costs in individual cases if it is uncertain
whether there is legal recourse to combat cross-border infringements. Instead, they
tend to prefer run-of-the-mill litigation in national courts, limited to domestic
infringement claims. In return, higher total legal costs and lengthier proceedings
become the norm. This makes patent litigation even more reserved to those parties
with the highest financial capabilities, and sometimes a mere stage for what is
expected to end as expensive settlements. Quite ironically, therefore, the current
shortage of clear boundaries for extraterritoriality in patent law might indeed fuel
territorialism, which in turn can severely disadvantage innovators and enterprises
in participating in the global marketplace. Another familiar and related downside
is the risk of potentially conflicting national judgments.168 The latter in particular
is perilous to international trade. The losing party may be forced to segregate or
abandon markets, relocate operations, or distribute different product versions in
different countries.
G. Uniformity
A concern closely tied and related to predictability is uniformity. This
concern again stems from an overemphasis on efficacy. Efficacy is inherently
biased. If efficacy is favored such that a particular rule of localization is applied
whenever it safeguards a higher level of protection and then applying another rule
of localization when there are no substantive differences between national laws,
alleged infringing parties are thrown into legal disorder. As a familiar example, in
Illumina, the England and Wales High Court refused to attribute the location of
computers abroad, on which the patented process was performed, any relevance in
localizing the infringement.169 Instead, the Court focused on the material gathered
Id. at 617.
Id.
166 Cf. Robins, supra note 66, at 1275 (recognizing the risk of companies relocating their
businesses where legal liability is minimal).
167 Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 85, at 255; Jacob A. Schroeder, So Long As You Live Under
My Roof, You’ll Live by . . . Whose Rules?: Ending the Extraterritorial Application of Patent Law,
18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 55, 92–93 (2009).
168 Dreyfuss, supra note 55, at 17–18.
169 Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and Wales High Court, EWHC
2930 (Pat) at 507–08 (U.K.).
164
165
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within the forum and subsequently shipped abroad for the purpose of localization.
This sets it apart from the default rule of localizing infringing use of method claims,
which is where the method is performed,170 with safeguarding efficacy as a major
explanation for such a departure. While it is true that different factors may need
to be taken into account to provide a fair outcome in different circumstances, a
complete change of the rules for localizing infringements is at the same time
adverse to uniformity and predictability.
V. A NEW APPROACH TO CLOSING THE PATENT LOOPHOLE
Globalization has meant tremendous opportunities for economic,
technological, and social development worldwide, but has too put overwhelming
pressure on the maintenance of traditional, territorial norms. The transnational
spread of regulated subject matter means that there is an inability to constrain the
effects of adjudication within each implicated country. Parties are, as a result,
forced to navigate through diverging legal standards on a country-by-country basis,
while courts are stuck with interpreting rules drafted from a different era. It is
becoming more and more recognized that this dichotomy between global markets
and national intellectual property rights is an unsustainable posture and that
there is a need for reform.
A. A Reappraisal of Existing Proposals
Because divided patent infringement is not a unique, national problem,
there is a demand to adopt a solution that is uniform and transferrable across
multiple jurisdictions. But as this seems like an impossible task to expect from
national courts, several commentators have attempted to fill in the gaps in an effort
to resolve the dilemma.
Professor Lemley et al. focus on the issue of dividing infringing activities
between different actors and in different countries. They suggest that careful
drafting of patent claims can resolve most cases of divided infringement.171 Claim
drafting puts the responsibility on the patent applicant, thus forcing the applicant
to consider ex ante the possibilities of third parties to divide their infringing
activities. This is no doubt a difficult and time-consuming task and becomes almost
impossible if applicants are to consider these future possibilities for the entire term
of the patent. It is also questionable if what is essentially a legislative gap should
mechanically be attributed to the patent holder. In addition, the proposition
assumes that all inventions can be drafted unitarily.172 Unitary claims are broader
and include fewer elements that can be divided geographically, but not all
inventions can be framed that way. Another problem is that multiple and broader
patent claims tend to be easier to render invalid as each claim includes fewer
elements.173 The advantages of claim drafting as a solution are, however, that it
170 Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1048 (2017).
See also Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that a patented method is concerned with the process, rather than the material or
apparatus used in that process).
171 Lemley et al., supra note 15, at 271–76.
172 The England and Wales Court of Appeal rejected in Menashe that claim drafting could
entirely resolve the issue of divided infringement, and chose not to place any legal emphasis on it
when localizing the infringement. See Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd.,
[2002] England and Wales Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1702 at 30 (U.K.).
173 Wasserman, supra note 8, at 300–01.
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works within the existing legal framework and that it provides a greater degree of
predictability ex ante to all parties concerned.174
Professor Wasserman instead places greater emphasis on the role of courts
in adopting a “substantial effects” test.175 The suggestion is that parties should be
deemed to engage in infringing activities if there is a substantial effect on the
domestic market.176 This mirrors how extraterritoriality has been dealt with in
antitrust and trademark law in the United States.177 To avoid an unduly broad
application that disregards foreign sovereignty, Professor Wasserman suggests
that courts should consider comity factors, such as the degree of conflict with
foreign policy or law, nationality and residence of the parties, the extent to which
foreign jurisdictions can provide a remedy, the relative impact of divided
infringement domestically as compared to elsewhere, intent to harm or affect
domestic commerce, and foreseeability of effects on the domestic market.178 What
constitutes substantive effects is, it is argued, commercial harm, 179 but as other
commentators have noted, this can vary in different contexts.180 How much
economic impact is enough can be difficult to ascertain without defined metrics, let
alone compare relative to other countries. This is also, as argued below,
inappropriate to assume as a blanket test for all types of infringing conduct in the
patent context.181 Professor Wasserman suggests comity as a constraint, in
particular, the relative impact of divided infringement domestically as compared
to elsewhere, but it is not sufficiently clarified how this balancing test should be
applied.182 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposal does not describe
the interaction between the localization of infringing conduct falling under patent
claims and exclusive rights.
Professor Holbrook likewise recognizes the importance of balancing the
interests of the forum with foreign sovereignty. Professor Holbrook proposes, as a
first step, that there must be at least some nexus to the country of the protection,
and as a second step, that there must be an infringement in both that country and
the foreign country implicated by the same conduct.183 The wide range of contacts
that can suffice lacks in predictability, and provides no screening mechanism to
filter out contacts for which there is insufficient sovereign interest in adjudicating.
Without that legal threshold, patent holders would be incentivized to sue on the
basis of weaker and thus less foreseeable contacts. While the dual infringement
prong raises a high legal bar, it is predominantly tailored to respect foreign
sovereignty and gives little assurances to the alleged infringer being sued. The
consideration given to other implicated countries is also arguably too much, as it

174 Cf. Jason R. Dinges, Extraterritorial Patent Infringement Liability after NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 32 J. CORP. L. 217, 235 (2006).
175 Wasserman, supra note 8, at 302–03.
176 Other similar approaches, but without the addition of comity, has been to assess whether
there is an economic harm to the patent holder in the relevant country of protection, see Hutchison
& Yahya, supra note 32, at 54; Elizabeth M. N. Morris, Territorial Impact Factors: An Argument
for Determining Patent Infringement Based upon Impact on the U.S. Market, 22 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 351, 365–68 (2006).
177 Wasserman, supra note 8, at 302–03 (citing, inter alia, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952)).
178 Id. at 304–06.
179 Id. at 302–03.
180 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2157–58.
181 See infra Section V(B)(1)(a).
182 Wasserman, supra note 8, at 305.
183 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2165–69.
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essentially gives absolute deference to foreign law even in the absence of deep
harmonization.184
Robins has taken a more nuanced approach. Robins suggests that if the
patent holder holds parallel patents in the other implicated jurisdictions, then
multi-jurisdictional litigation should be the first and preferred option.185 If,
however, no such patents exist, it is proposed that it should be examined whether
the disputed subject matter is capable of patent protection abroad and if a foreign
patent could not have been drafted to cover the infringing activity. Only if the
answer is affirmative to both of these questions, then should courts engage in an
extraterritorial application.186 This gives less deference to foreign sovereignty than
Professor Holbrook’s proposal, but like Professor Lemley et al., it is problematic in
that it places too much accountability on the patent holder for what are really
legislative gaps. Furthermore, it assumes that an extraterritorial application is an
exceptional recourse in cross-border contexts when at least to some degree it is
always a necessary ingredient in the course of localizing infringements.187 Robins
also suggests that the control and beneficial use test from Decca is suitable to
resolve the issue of divided infringement if an extraterritorial application is
engaged.188 But even if decades have passed since Decca it still remains largely
unclear what control and benefits are sufficient to drag foreign activities into the
scope of infringement.189
Professor Trimble has argued, in contrast to Professor Holbrook and
Robins, that there may be no need to ascertain patentability or the illegality of the
infringing conduct under foreign laws.190 If the alleged infringer is not domiciled or
has no assets in the forum, then the refusal of foreign courts to recognize such a
judgment would create, it is argued, natural boundaries to the extraterritorial
application of patent laws.191 While this certainly has truth to it, as courts refuse
to recognize foreign judgments on this ground on a regular basis,192 it is lacking in
that it puts sovereign control in the hands of the parties. It is also true, as has been
mentioned earlier,193 that even if there is a legal basis to prescribe over
cross-border infringing conduct, that adjudication can still have foreign private or
public effects, for instance in the case of injunctions. If adjudication is successfully
enforced in the forum, other states sharing an interest in the conduct would suffer
yet. Furthermore, placing all emphasis on the stage of enforcement imposes no
concrete legal restrictions that are ascertainable ex ante, which undermines
certainty and predictability.

See supra Section IV(A).
Robins, supra note 66, at 1295–96.
186 Id. at 1311–13.
187 See supra Section III(E)(1).
188 Robins, supra note 66, at 1313.
189 Several commentators have noted the ambiguities of test in Decca, see Yar Chaikovsky &
Adrian Percer, Globalization, Technology without Boundaries & (and) the Scope of U.S. Patent
Law, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95, 101–02 (2005); Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 85, at 247–48;
Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 32, at 50; Dinges, supra note 174, at 234; Osborne, supra note 85,
at 592–93; Bridget A. O’Leary Smith, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.: Losing Control and
Finding the Locus of Infringing Use, 46 JURIMETRICS 437, 445, 452–57 (2006); Holbrook, supra
note 1, at 2158–59.
190 Trimble, supra note 1, at 124–25.
191 Id. at 124–25.
192 See cases referred to in supra note 139.
193 See supra Section IV(A).
184
185
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In another proposal, Haupt instead emphasizes the localization of the
invention, similarly to what has already been considered by some courts.194 The
argument is that in cases of divided infringement, the infringing conduct should be
localized to where the “core” of the invention is utilized.195 This departs from an all
elements rule and substitutes it with a test which mirrors much of what is used in
assessing inventive step in European jurisdictions, which Haupt also notes.196 A
claim-based approach has similarly been identified by Romandini and Klicznik,
which largely draws on the approach from the United Kingdom in Menasche and
Motorola.197 In these cases, the results from the claim construction on what was
the “substance” of the invention were used to localize the infringement. Still,
several commentators have pointed out the difficulties of pinpointing what is
essential in an invention in cross-border situations, and how this could pose serious
problems for combination inventions.198
Finally, although some courts and commentators have turned to indirect
liability in cross-border cases,199 it is insufficient in the sense that it assumes that
all inventions capable of divided infringement are divided because of a separation
into physical parts. Another problem that has been mentioned is that some
jurisdictions assume a double territorial requirement,200 meaning that both the act
of offering or supplying components of the invention and the subsequent infringing
use has to be localized to the same country of protection. This rules out indirect
infringement as recourse for most divided infringement scenarios, and to become
effective this requirement has to be deleted or revised. Moreover, indirect liability
is derivative of the commitment of a primary wrongful act.201 This means that if no
primary infringement has been committed then, generally, any indirect liability
will be excluded as well.202 This in turn renders difficulties in private international
law. The prevailing view from national courts and scholars is that the secondary
infringing act in a cross-border situation shall follow the law applicable to the
primary infringing act.203 While that at first seems straightforward and logical, it
can impose significant problems to potential infringers acting as intermediaries, as
194 See Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Illumina, Inc v.
Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] EWHC 2930 (Pat) at 507 (U.K.).
195 Haupt, supra note 7, at 189, 191. Similar arguments have been raised by other
commentators on the basis of the “patently distinctive” test from Decca, see, e.g., Osborne, supra
note 85, at 611–12 (arguing that locating the patently distinctive part of the invention is, or at
least, should be a possible recourse to avoid loopholes).
196 Haupt, supra note 7, at 190.
197 See Romandini & Klicznik, supra note 77, at 532–33.
198 Id. at 533. See also Kupzok, supra note 1, at 331; Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2160.
199 Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., [2002] England and Wales Court
of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1702 at 32 (U.K.); Lee, supra note 1, at 367; Benyamini, supra note 87, at
240–41.
200 See supra Section III(E)(2), with references to Germany and the United Kingdom as
examples.
201 See OBG Ltd. v. Allan, [2008] 1 AC 1, 27 (U.K.); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (for some examples of exceptions, see Paul S. Davies,
Accessory Liability, 223–25 (1st ed. 2015)); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A Comparative Analysis of the
Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers, SECONDARY L IABILITY OF INTERNET SERVICE
PROVIDERS 10 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2017).
202 See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 922 (2014) (“where
there has been no direct infringement, there can be no inducement of infringement under
§ 271(b).”).
203 Subafilms, Ltd. v MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (United
States); Abkco Music & Records Inc. v. Music Collection Int’l Ltd., [1995] RPC 657 (U.K.);
Folgerecht bei Auslandsbezug, 1994 GRUR 798, I ZR 24/92 (Ger.); Bradley, supra note 79, at 573–
75; Matulionytė, supra note 75, at 50–58 (with further references).
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it impairs the possibilities to ascertain ex ante what law must be followed.204 For
indirect infringement to actually resolve the problem of divided infringement, it is
clear that significant substantive revision is needed. Most statutes on indirect
liability were drafted in an age when digital inventions did not exist or were not
commonplace, and so the language often turns on physical components. This does
not mean, however, that lessons cannot still be drawn from indirect liability
standards.
B. A Substantive Balancing Test
A fundamental flaw in previous proposals is that the issue of localizing
infringing conduct is disengaged from what patent law is about. A “substantial
effects” or “economic” test assumes that commercial harm is a prerequisite for
patent infringement, which indirectly shifts the focus to objective territoriality.
While patents serve important commercial interests, patent law imposes no
additional requirement, such as proving commercial harm, in order to exercise
exclusive rights. Patent infringement is a strict liability tort,205 and the mere fact
that conduct is cross-border should not change that. The “control” and “beneficial
use” test which has lingered in the United States also has no plausible legal basis
in patent law. Even if it could be refined to minimize existing uncertainties, there
is, and never has been, a statutory requirement that a patent holder must prove
that third parties have controlled the invention and accrued benefits in order to
invoke granted remedies.206 Each of these tests, if pursued, imposes a risk that the
localization of patent infringement becomes disconnected from what is the actual
subject of the infringement, that is the exploitation of the invention. There is also
a need to recognize that patents are unique from other intellectual property rights.
While all intellectual property rights suffer more or less from tensions between
territoriality and cross-border use, patents bring an added tier of complexity with
the need to satisfy patent claims in order to infringe, which essentially turns on a
technical analysis.
The line of cases and proposals that instead target the use of the invention
as a proxy for the question of localization similarly suffer shortcomings. The scope
and limits of the “patently distinctive” test in Decca and the “substance” of the
invention test in Menashe were never defined, and remained largely unclear. The
problems associated with cases where no essential part of the invention can be
attributed to a particular claim element, as is the case for combination inventions,
were also never explained.207 Furthermore, no considerations were proposed to
identify possible foreign effects as a result of the adjudication, and thus essentially
ignored potential adverse impacts on sovereignty and foreign public and private
interests.
204 For criticism in the copyright and trademark context related to this problem, see Graeme
B. Dinwoodie et al., The Law Applicable to Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 201, 207–09 (2009).
205 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (both characterizing patent
infringement as strict liability). For a more nuanced discussion on strict liability in patent law,
see generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799 (2002).
206 O’Leary Smith, supra note 189, at 455.
207 See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2160 (criticizing that “[t]here need not be a singular,
defining feature of an invention that is key to its patentability, which renders this test difficult,
if not impossible, to apply.”).
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There is then a logical and legal gap between how the invention as defined
in the claims is being utilized in cross-border situations, and how that should guide
weighing sovereign, public, and private interests. But, of course, this does not have
to be a one-sided analysis. What constitutes sufficient nexus to the country of
protection is a flexible enough concept to consider both contacts and interests, 208
and the fact that sovereignty is a shared duty suggests that such calling is indeed
warranted.209 This is not an easy exercise. A test has to be carefully defined and
limited to avoid turning it into an all-inclusive balancing test or respecting foreign
sovereignty at the absolute expense of national sovereignty.
This article presents a new proposal for closing the patent loophole, which
has remained wide open for far too long. The first premise is that the analysis must
be separated into what constitutes a technical and commercial appropriation of the
invention, depending on what is the alleged infringing conduct. The basic objective
is to align the jurisdictional analysis, starting with what constitutes sufficient
nexus, with what is relevant for each form of infringing conduct.
Whether there is a technical appropriation of an invention in cross-border
contexts, as is the case of making or use, is in essence a technical test from the
perspective of a skilled person in the art. That examination should further extend
to where the invention is exploited in cross-border contexts. The task is not to tie
the achievement of the technical contribution to a specific claim element. Instead,
the effort is concentrated on relating that contribution to what is a tangible result,
which manifests itself in the alleged infringing conduct. Unlike other proposals,
the all elements rule is still respected, but instead of localizing each claim element,
we are tying them to what has been defined as the locus of the technical
contribution. The issue of divided infringement is avoided by letting that location
become the proxy for what law is applicable to the infringing conduct falling under
the entire claim.
There is no issue of divided patent claims for what counts as a commercial
appropriation of the invention. This simplifies and streamlines the analysis for
alleged infringing conduct such as offers or sales of infringing products or
processes. Instead of being concerned with a technical analysis of the invention and
its manifested locus, there is then a focus on what is the commercial impact and
control, and where. This acts on the assumption that both subjective and objective
territorial factors can be relevant for what can constitute sufficient nexus.
This split analysis will form the basis for identifying a nexus which is
closely linked to what is most relevant for the alleged infringing conduct. The
emphasis on proximity minimizes, but does not eliminate, appreciable impacts in
other countries. Since we are ultimately delving into what is the interpretation of
national patent law, it is conceivable that different courts in different jurisdictions
will adopt their own variations of what constitutes a sufficient nexus. There is an

208 Weighing both contacts and interests into the question of prescriptive jurisdiction has long
been advocated in both the United States and Europe as a means of adding a necessary level of
flexibility in considering sovereignty and avoid unqualified and rigid exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness,
245 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 45 (1994); David J. Gerber, The Extraterritorial Application of German
Antitrust Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 756, 779–83 (1983); Ryngaert, supra note 23, at 800–01; Larry
Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, SUP. CT. REV. 179, 220–
21 (1991). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1986) (listing
both private and state interests as factors to consider in assessing whether prescriptive
jurisdiction is unreasonable).
209 See Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 829, 839
(1928).
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inherent and required degree of flexibility to account for varying circumstances.
Technical respectively commercial proximity is, therefore, the starting point for
narrowing down the nexus, but is not the end of the analysis. To counter potential
spillover effects on foreign markets, it is also proposed that alternative contacts
which have been identified are weighed against each other. This fills a
much-needed gap where courts routinely localize infringements with little to no
consideration as to how that impacts foreign conduct and states. Finally, due
weight is still given to any reasonable accountability that can be traced to the
patent holder and ensures that an extraterritorial application is not withdrawn
when there is a clear intention from the alleged infringer to benefit from the
invention in the domestic market.
The proposed guidelines provide a structured methodology to follow when
considering whether or not to assert prescriptive jurisdiction in a cross-border
setting. The objective is to aid courts in determining whether it is appropriate to
apply national patent law, and to what extent. The figure below shows a flowchart
of the different steps in the analysis.
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1. Step I: Defining the Nexus
The starting point of the jurisdictional analysis lies in defining the nexus
to the relevant country of protection. With concurrent, prescriptive jurisdiction as
the current legal framework, courts are becoming more liberal in what constitutes
sufficient nexus based on objective or subjective territorial factors. This in theory
opens up for a flexible and all-inclusive approach, where a variety of factors can be
taken into account in pinpointing the nexus.210 But this arguably comes at the cost
of predictability and uniformity, inviting more suits on a weaker basis, and more
so against the interests of foreign states. Instead of enforcing restraint merely at a
later stage in the analysis,211 it is here argued that a fair substantive outcome is
better served by framing the connecting factor in its appropriate light from the
start. The guiding criteria in this context should be how the connecting factor
actually relates to the conduct which is alleged to be infringing under national
patent law. In other words, the conduct must be related to what jurisdiction it is
being subject to, and sufficient enough to interfere with the patent holder’s own
exercise of the exclusive rights.
This can further be compared and contrasted to the “focus” test as part of
the presumption against extraterritoriality, which is also framed to hook
prescriptive jurisdiction over connections directly related to the exclusive rights
but from a statutory construction.212 The unfortunate outcome of the “focus” test,
as has been explained above,213 is that there is an overemphasis on vague and
open-ended statutory language. Too often this ends with a prohibitive conclusion
as to whether cross-border conduct can amount to infringement or not. 214 In
contrast to the presumption against extraterritoriality, it is here recognized that
there is a critical need to distinguish localization from a presumptively prohibited
extraterritorial application. The act of localizing patent infringement in a
cross-border situation is an absolute necessity, both as a legal and practical matter
if adhering to lex loci protectionis as the standard choice of law rule. It is precisely
the results from the localization that forms the basis for assuming prescriptive
jurisdiction,215 which is not incompliant with public international law.
a. Does the Alleged Infringing Conduct Target Technical or Commercial
Appropriation?
It is clear that there is confusion amongst both courts and commentators
as to what should be the appropriate theoretical framework in localizing patent
infringement. The Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf adopted in Prepaid-Karten II an
approach that focused on the commercial intent to exercise the invention in

See in this regard Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2170–71.
This could be compared with, as an example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1986), which acts as a limiting threshold for what is a wide range of
connecting factors in § 402 that could be sufficient to assert prescriptive jurisdiction.
212 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). See also Timothy
R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1745, 1779–80 (2017) (suggesting that the “focus” test delineates what is sufficient nexus
and which is analyzed from the prescriptive of the scope of the exclusive rights).
213 See supra Section III(E)(1).
214 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 456 (2007).
215 See Trimble, supra note 1, at 117; Neumann, supra note 75, at 520–22.
210
211
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Germany, even if the alleged infringing conduct was use of a process.216 Professor
Chisum has similarly argued that “a patent’s scope should match, in function,
though not necessarily in physical terms, the ‘market’ of the territory of the country
issuing the patent.”217 Other commentators have followed in that same line and
held that commercial effects or economic harm in the country of protection should
be a prerequisite to asserting prescriptive jurisdiction in cross-border cases.218 That
approach has not been restricted to merely offers or sales and has instead been
proposed across the board, for all types of infringing conduct. Other courts and
commentators have, in contrast, and as mentioned above,219 used a predominantly
technical approach in examining cross-border patent infringement as it relates to
an infringing use, but without remarking what should be the appropriate legal
standard for other types of infringing conduct. There is an important distinction
between, on the one hand, that there is a commercial interest to the patent holder
in exercising all exclusive rights, and on the other hand, that the substantive
breadth of those rights should be determined by predominantly commercial factors.
This article argues that, while there is indeed a wide commercial interest
overshadowing all exclusive rights, how these rights are interpreted substantively
differ as a result of differences from what is the form of appropriation.
Adopting a framework that ties the relevant connecting factors to the
relevant exercise of the exclusive rights makes sense because it structures the
analysis towards what is the real legal basis and scope of prescriptive jurisdiction.
Although there are contrasting and much more detailed approaches as to what
constitutes infringement in different jurisdictions, these forms of infringing
conduct can effectively be grouped into what is either technical or commercial
appropriation of the invention. This characterization is important in the context of
localization, and in particular, as a first step in this analysis because what the
appropriation of the invention is will impact what connecting factors should be
given legal weight. It will also be decisive for whether it is necessary to delve into
localization of the infringing conduct falling under the patent claims or the
exclusive rights, or both.
The making of a product concerns when all claim elements are embodied
in a product, thus resulting in a tangible replication of the invention. 220 The use of
a product or process instead occurs when that product or process is put into effect

216 See supra Section III(E)(2), referring to Prepaid-Karten II, Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf,
Dec. 10, 2009, 2 U 51/08 (Ger.).
217 Chisum, supra note 20, at 608.
218 See supra Section V(A), referring to Wasserman, supra note 8, at 302–03; Hutchison &
Yahya, supra note 32, at 54; Morris, supra note 176, at 365–68.
219 See supra Sections III(E)(3) and V(A), referring to, inter alia, Decca, Ltd. v. United States,
544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Menashe Bus. Mercantile Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., [2002]
England and Wales Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ 1702 at 33 (U.K.); Research in Motion U.K. Ltd.
v. Motorola Inc., [2010] England and Wales High Court, EWHC 118 (Pat) at 156 (U.K.); Haupt,
supra note 7, at 189, 191; Osborne, supra note 85, at 611–12.
220 Benyamini, supra note 87, at 102; Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 85, at 264. See also
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1972) (a product is not “made”
unless all constituent parts of a product are assembled); Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. Delta
Airways, Inc., [2010] England and Wales High Court, EWHC 3094 (Pat) at 131–35 (U.K.)
(considering that there is no direct infringement through making, use, offers for disposal or
disposal of a kit of unassembled parts, but instead indirect infringement). But note that other
jurisdictions have uphold laxer legal standards, by considering is sufficient that if all essential
parts, notwithstanding excluded non-essential parts, are assembled. See Benyamini, supra note
87, at 102 (citing UNO City I [Supreme Court of Austria] 1987, 18 IIC 525, 528 (Austria); UNO
City II [Supreme Court of Austria] 1989, 19 IIC 383, 386 (Austria)).
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so as to achieve the envisaged technical result of the invention.221 What these
activities have in common is that there is a technical form of appropriation, as it
has been defined in the patent claims. When that transpires in a cross-border
context, it will therefore also become necessary to ascertain where that
appropriation occurs. This means that whether the patent claim is satisfied or not
is also directly informing where the exclusive right is exercised, and it is therefore
in this setting that the issue of divided patent claims arises and should properly be
analyzed.
In contrast, the act of offering and selling addresses the commercialization
of products or processes, or products derived from processes, which embody the
invention. Acts such as advertising, displaying or soliciting orders, and ultimately
dispensing the products or services into the stream of commerce are all commercial
acts.222 While all elements of the patent claim must still be satisfied, there is simply
no need in these cases to consider if previous use or making was infringing, and as
a result neither a need to consider where the making occurred. This also means
that the content of the patent claims no longer becomes an issue for the purpose of
localization, which instead becomes limited to localizing the points of contacts
attributed to those activities only. The issue of divided infringing acts, but not
divided patent claims, thus exists in this regard.
Indirect infringement, through offering or supplying essential components
for carrying out the invention with the requisite knowledge, lies in the middle of
these two forms of infringing appropriations. The initial acts of offering or
supplying are too commercial acts but are specifically directed at the distribution
of means for putting the invention into effect. Different courts have understood
that or similar requirements differently,223 but it is nonetheless clear that the
means provided must be relevant to the technical appropriation of the invention.
This too means that the issue of both divided patent claims and infringing acts
arises in cases of indirect infringement. In this intermediate category also lies
infringing conduct such as offering, selling, or using products derived from a
patented process, which is an exclusive right belonging to the patent holder in many
221 Benyamini, supra note 87, at 122, 133; Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 85, at 265; Dan L.
Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68
TUL. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (1993). See also NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1316–17 (turning to the ordinary
meaning of “use” as “put into action or service”); Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10–11
(1913) (stating that the right to “use” is a comprehensive term which embraces “the right to put
into service any given invention.”).
222 Benyamini, supra note 87, at 114–21, 137–39; Hutchison & Yahya, supra note 85, at 265–
66; 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that
offers to sale generate an interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment
of the patent holder). In some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, however, disposition is
examined through a contractual rather than a commercial lens, as has been mentioned elsewhere,
see supra note 92.
223 See Nestec SA v. Dualit Ltd., [2013] English and Wales High Court, EWHC 923 (Pat) at
168–76 (U.K.) (summarizing the various approaches taken in Europe, on the one hand, whether
means must contribute to implementing the technical teaching of the invention, citing
Flügelradzähler, German Federal Court of Justice, 2004 GRUR 758, X ZR 48/03 (Ger.), and on
the other hand, whether the means must be such that distinguish the invention from prior art,
citing Sara Lee v. Integro, Dutch Supreme Court, Case C02/227HR (Neth.)); Golden Blount, Inc.
v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that the defendant must
have known “that the combination for which its components were especially made was both
patented and infringing” and that defendant’s components have “no substantial non-infringing
uses.”); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213 (1980) (explaining that patent
holders are merely authorized to control non-staple goods that are capable of only of infringing
use in a patented invention, and that are essential to the invention’s advance over prior art). See
also Benyamini, supra note 87, at 197–203.
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jurisdictions.224 In most jurisdictions the exclusive rights afforded to the patent
holder are mirrored for the resulting products, even if it is the process that is
subject to patent protection. The rationale behind this is that it is deemed that the
economic value of the invention really lies in the product.225 Depending on what is
the envisaged infringing conduct, there can then be either technical or commercial
appropriation of the product obtained by the process.
In sum, whether the alleged infringing conduct targets a technical or
commercial appropriation of the invention or both, is an essential first step in
understanding which direction the jurisdictional analysis should take and how the
infringing conduct should be localized.
b. What is the Technical Contribution of the Invention and Where is it Achieved?
If the alleged infringing conduct is concerned with what is a technical
appropriation of the invention, it must be defined what the appropriate nexus
should be. It is here proposed that a two-step analysis should be adopted: first,
identifying what is the technical contribution of the claimed invention, and second,
ascertaining where that technical contribution is achieved in the context of the
alleged infringing conduct. The logic is that whether conduct falls under a patent
claim or not is a technical test. This fundamental criteria for assessing patent
infringement should not be abandoned merely because conduct is now cross-border.
Just as we examine when there is infringement from a technical standpoint, so
should we evaluate where an infringement occurs from that same lens.
The first prong of this test, defining the technical contribution of the
claimed invention, would necessarily draw upon existing experiences from national
patent law. Even if the concept of technical contribution is perhaps most familiar
in Europe to distinguish between technical and non-technical claim elements for
the purpose of examining novelty and inventive step,226 similar approaches have
also been taken for assessing infringement. A purposive construction that involves
delving into the objective behind the invention, as it is expressed in the claims, has
long been the default method for construing patents in the United Kingdom,227

224 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2021) (“[w]hoever without authority imports into the United States
or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer”); The Patents Act, 1977 § 60(1)(c)
(U.K.) (“where the invention is a process, he disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports any
product obtained directly by means of that process or keeps any such product whether for disposal
or otherwise”); 特許法 Tokkyohō [Japanese Patent Act] 1959, Article 101(vi) (“where a patent has
been granted for an invention of a process of producing a product, acts of possessing the product
produced by the said process for the purpose of assigning, etc. or exporting it as a business”).
225 See Benyamini, supra note 87, at 157–58.
226 See EPO Board of Appeals T 154/04 (Estimating sales activity/DUNS LICENSING
ASSOCIATES); EPO Board of Appeals T 258/03 (Auction method/HITACHI).
227 Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd., [1982] RPC 183 at 244 (U.K.) (emphasizing
a purposive and construction of patent claims to discern what is the “pith and marrow” of the
claim when assessing infringement).
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France,228 Germany,229 Canada,230 and Sweden231. In these jurisdictions, and as
well as in the United States,232 a claim construction focused on giving a technical
purpose behind claim elements is also assumed under the doctrine of equivalents.
The trend is to treat the person skilled in the art as the legal departure for
examining whether the alleged infringing product or performance fulfills the
elements of the claim, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
The second prong of this test localizes the technical contribution, as it has
been defined in the claimed invention and as it is manifested in the alleged
infringing activities. This rule is workable for the same reason that abstract ideas
or concepts are not patentable. Inventions must be able to be carried out to be
patentable. The contribution that is expected to be achieved must be capable of
being manifested and replicated. The premise is therefore that this manifestation
has a locus, which in turn can be attributed to the infringing conduct. To be clear,
we are not concerned with a technical contribution that distinguishes the invention
from prior art, which is an analysis typically reserved for invalidity. Instead, we
are concerned with the locus attributed to achieving the technical contribution, as
it is apparent in the form of a manifested technical effect in the infringing conduct.
The task here is not to isolate what is the “heart” or “essential” use of the
invention in the infringing conduct. Some methods have no individual essential
steps,233 and systems or products have no individual essential components. The
technical effect can be collective, as a result of the performance or presence of
several steps or parts. It will not be possible in these cases to attribute the
achievement of the technical contribution to a particular claim element.234 The
same is true for combination inventions, where the invention really lies in the act
of combining separate parts, and selection and problem inventions, where the
technical contribution is not tied to an individual component in the claim or even
anything in the claim at all. The technical contribution is then instead converted
to what is ultimately a tangible result.235 While this at first sight can seem
228 Dolle v. Emsens [Court of Appeal of Paris] 1990, Ann. Propr. Ind., 235 (Fr.) (claims should
be construed purposively to define the substance of the invention when assessing infringement).
229 Drehzahlermittlung, German Federal Court of Justice, 2004, GRUR 844, X ZR 82/03
(Ger.) (stressing the importance for claim construction of establishing the technical meaning of
claim elements and what their contribution is to the intended result); Spannschraube, German
Federal Court of Justice, IIC 1999, 30, 932 X ZR 85/96 (Ger.) (patent terms are to be given a
meaning such that the technical function is properly reflected).
230 Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., Canadian Supreme Court, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067 (Can.)
(claims should be given a purposive construction to determine what are the essential elements of
the invention).
231 Case PMT 6900-16, Jul. 10, 2017, Svea Court of Appeals (Swe.); NJA 2000 § 497, Swedish
Supreme Court (Swed.) (emphasizing that the scope of patent protection is determined against
the inventive concept as described in the patent).
232 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609–10 (1950) (establishing
the doctrine of equivalence and stressing the consideration given to the purpose behind claim
elements, as understood from a person skilled in the art).
233 Cf. NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1318 (holding that a method or process consists of one or more
operative steps, and, accordingly, “[i]t is well established that a patent for a method or process is
not infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized.” (citing Roberts Dairy
Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
234 See Kupzok, supra note 1, at 331; Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2160.
235 The Federal Circuit rejected in Bayer an argument that 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) extended to the
production of information. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceutical, Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1370,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit also rejected a similar argument in NTP (II), where it
considered that the patent which covered the transmission of information through e-mail
messages did not entail the manufacturing of a physical product. See NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1323–
24. But unlike those cases, it is here not argued that the tangible result of method claims should
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incompatible with the two steps detailed above, the fundamental question which is
decisive for localizing the infringing conduct remains the same. We are still
identifying what is the technical contribution to the invention as a first step, then
as a second step localizing the tangible result that exercises that contribution, as
it has been manifested in the alleged infringing conduct. When the achievement of
the technical contribution is merged with the tangible result of the claim, so will
therefore the infringing conduct also become tied to that result.236 This approach
can be distinguished from the “patently distinctive” test in Decca and the
“substance” of the invention test in Menashe, where both courts engaged in
pinpointing what was deemed essential in the invention. While it is true that
technical contribution can sometimes be related to what is the “core” of the
invention, there is here no proposed claim dissection. The focus is instead on the
tangible results.
This analysis should not change depending on claim type. The proposition
from the Federal Circuit in NTP (II), that system claims should be treated
differently as these involve the collective rather than individual use of
components,237 is overly formulaic and should not be followed. 238 Claim types are
directed at different kinds of infringing activities. While claim type can of course
impact what form of conduct is considered infringing, all patent claims remain
equally territorially limited, regardless of format.
To exemplify how the analysis above would work in practice, let us assume
that an invention is related to artificial intelligence, covering a neural networking
method for translating words comprised of four components: storing training data
from word dictionaries, selecting data samples from the training data, generating
negative samples used for prediction analysis, and training a language model using
these samples. It would be simple enough to divide these elements into different
jurisdictions for a presumptive infringer. The training data could be gathered in
country A and stored on a cloud storage system on servers situated in country B.
That data could then be accessed in country C to select and generate negative
samples, and subsequently accessed in country D to perform the training analysis.
Let us further assume that the patent is construed such that the technical
contribution lies in the interaction of the different steps, in particular in how
training data is categorized and used for prediction analysis and how the language
model is trained. It would run contrary to that claim construction to attribute the
technical contribution to each specific country where a step is being performed, if
that contribution instead really lies in an interaction of steps. Any attempt to
localize the infringing conduct to each such country would then be liable to result
in excessive jurisdiction and legal discrepancies. Instead, it is much closer at hand
to assume that the technical contribution has become merged with use of the
method as a whole. It is then the tangible result of that method that is focused on
for the purpose of localization, which would be after all steps are combined to form
the language model. Of course, it is possible that a prospective infringer has
be treated as a product in interpreting patent statutes. The tangible result is simply invoked to
pinpoint and localize what is otherwise an intangible part of the invention.
236 A similar proposition has been made by Hutchison & Yahya, holding that use of a patented
end product technology occurs where the end use of the technology is located. See Hutchison &
Yahya, supra note 85, at 265 (citing David Vaver, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT,
PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS 151–52 (1st. ed. 1997)).
237 NTP, Inc., 418 F.3d at 1317–18.
238 This artificial legal division in the context of extraterritoriality has unsurprisingly been
subject to significant criticism, see Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2152–53; Wasserman, supra note 8,
at 291.
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arranged its business operations, such that the tangible result is achieved where
there is no directly infringing use. It then becomes essential to seek out legal relief
based on other exclusive rights, as just the exclusive right to use the invention can
obviously never be enough to capture all forms of infringing conduct. We must then
instead look to other exclusive rights, such as offering to sell or sell products
obtained directly from the process. We will then be localizing those offers or sales.
What has been described above is not an unprecedented approach. In
Decca, even if the instructions or programs used as part of the system were a set of
equations, the Court found that “the means for receiving the signals and processing
them and the means for performing those instructions and achieving the end result
quite clearly have a tangible, physical existence which meets the terms of the
claim.”239 It was the control and beneficial use of that equipment within the United
States that subsequently formed the basis for concluding that there was
infringement.240 This shows how embodiments that are the result of the use of the
invention can be invoked for the purpose of localizing the infringing conduct. This
also becomes similar to the approach taken in Germany in localizing direct patent
infringement to where all steps are finalized. Depending on the nature of the
invention, as was the logic in that case, it will be in that final destination where
the advantages of the entire process are realized.241
The technical contribution which is manifested in the infringing conduct
does not have to be subject to a single locus. The tangible result can sometimes be
replicated across different jurisdictions. Depending on the nature of the invention
and how it is construed, there can be several loci, in which case each becomes a
connecting factor for localizing the infringement. That there can multiple loci to
where the technical contribution is achieved is not just called for as a matter of
technical sense and logic, but is also reasonable in ensuring effective patent
enforcement. If for example the alleged infringer has no assets in countries where
some of the infringing activities are deemed to take place, or is domiciled in a
jurisdiction unsusceptible to enforcing foreign judgments, then it becomes essential
to be able to sue for infringement in other countries where are relevant contacts
for the purpose of exercising the invention.
A drawback of the proposed test is that what is the technical contribution
is a question that depends on what law is applicable. Different jurisdictions assume
different tests, and some jurisdictions may even have to develop new tests. This
comes at a cost of predictability for foreign actors, but no more than what is already
expected for multi-jurisdictional and cross-border conduct, which will always have
to face discrepant infringement and validity standards as a result of a lack of deep
harmonization. That loss of predictability should also be deemed acceptable as it
conforms the issue of localization to what is really deemed most essential behind
the alleged infringing use of the invention, but without engaging in a “dissecting”
approach which sometimes has been pursued by courts and commentators. This
frames the jurisdictional question in a more natural light and links it closer to
proximity. Furthermore, using a technical test for the purpose of localizing
infringing conduct is arguably more predictable for the parties concerned than
concentrating on control or derived benefits. These criteria inherently result in less
predictability ex ante and have no robust basis in patent law.

Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1080 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
Id. at 1083.
241 See Rohrschweissverfahren, German Federal Court of Justice, Feb. 24, 2007, X ZR 113/04
(Ger.).
239
240
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c. All Claim Elements Should be Subject to the Locus of the Technical
Contribution
The above does not suggest that other claim elements which are not
attributable to the same locus of the technical contribution should be ignored in
cross-border cases. All claim elements must still be fulfilled; otherwise we would
effectively be redrafting the invention. This important premise comes at a tactful
balancing task, however. On the one hand, it would largely render patent
protection and enforcement obsolete for divided patent claims if we persist in
requiring that all elements are fulfilled in one specific country of protection. On the
other hand, it would similarly be counterproductive to adjudicate these elements
under the law of their natural locus. Such a disruptive analysis would be liable to
result in legal discrepancies. This suggests that neither an overly restrictive nor
expansive approach is workable and that there is a need to find a more balanced
solution.
Patent claims merely function as limitations of national exclusive rights
granted by the legislature. In that light and as has been concluded earlier,242 it is
true that all claim elements must be subject to the application of the same law
under which they were generated, that is lex loci protectionis. The application of a
single national law, however, is not to be confused with a territorial requirement.
There is an important difference between ascertaining whether all claim elements
are satisfied under the application of a single national law and whether all claim
elements are satisfied in one specific country of protection. A solution that avoids
both the limitations of a strict territorial approach and disparate legal conditions
resulting from a looser application is to tie all claim elements to the locus of the
technical contribution, whether essential or non-essential, and ask under that
same applicable law whether there is an infringement. 243 This would satisfy the
need for uniformity, predictability, and efficacy. A single national law is invoked to
evaluate the entire infringing conduct, and since that is in turn tied to where the
technical contribution is achieved, it is closely related to what is the core of the
invention and thus most liable to interfere with the exclusive rights. This would
not offend foreign sovereignty as there is no justifiable interest in exclusively
adjudicating the conduct, and as there is no prohibition in public international law
against taking into account foreign facts in adjudicating cross-border conduct
which have sufficient domestic nexus.244
d. What is Commercial Impact and Control and Where is it Cognizable?
If the alleged infringing conduct is instead concerned with what is a
commercial appropriation of the invention, the focus of the nexus shifts to that
See supra Section III(E)(1).
This then becomes akin to the legal treatment of indirect liability in cross-border contexts,
as mentioned above, where the secondary infringing act follows the law applicable to the primary
infringing act. See supra Section V(A). A similar proposal has also been raised by Professor
Holbrook, with references to 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(f) by analogy. Professor Holbrook suggests that so
long that is some domestic nexus, then national courts should assess whether the patent is
infringed notwithstanding territorial boundaries. See Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2171–72. The
differences between that approach and the present is that it is here instead proposed that we
limit that nexus to constitute what is the technical contribution of the invention. Furthermore,
instead of ignoring territorial lines, we are here attributing all claim elements to what is a strong
connecting factor, rather than merely “some” nexus as Professor Holbrook proposes.
244 See supra Section III(E)(1).
242
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same lens. The legal concepts of calculating commercial detriment, through
measurements of actual or potential loss of sales or price erosion, are well familiar
in patent law. Those concepts still remain applicable when the infringement is
geographically divided, with the added element of attributing such effects to a
domestic market.245 Courts have commonly localized offers and sales to the country
of protection where the actual customer is residing, and thus where the act is
deemed consummated.246 The more problematic cases have been where offers are
made on the internet without a clear and defined recipient. An increasing number
of courts have resorted to the targeting doctrine in this regard, even if with some
inconsistent results.247 To be clear, it is not the intention as such which is in focus
in cases of targeting, but the potential that there is a manifested commercial
impact in the relevant country of protection. The intention is a mere proxy for that
purpose for acts that have yet been consummated. A substantial effect test, which
has been proposed in the context of divided patent claims as opposed to divided
infringing acts,248 could be a workable criterion for this purpose, save for the need
to define what effect is substantial enough. 249 Another feasible alternative is to
admit that almost any commercial impact is sufficient to count as nexus. So long
as the infringement is not de minimis, and thus arguably within the scope of the
exclusive rights, so should the patent holder be able to enforce its right even in a
cross-border environment. Whether that commercial impact is of such magnitude
that it outweighs foreign implicated interests could then instead be more properly
considered in the second step of the analysis below when weighing contacts.250
It is clear that a full-fledged commercial impact test faces difficulties in
capturing all relevant infringing conduct. Because this test only focuses on actual
or potential effects, it is imperfect in the sense that it neglects the infringing acts
themselves. But serious doubt has been raised as to whether offers or sales
consummated abroad can constitute patent infringement, with some commentators
maintaining that “prohibiting mere offers in the United States made solely to
effectuate lawful transactions outside the United States is, in effect, an indirect
regulation of that foreign activity.”251 The problem with that argument, however,
is that it neglects that not just objective but also subjective territoriality has an
important place in regulating infringing conduct. With patent infringement being
a strict liability tort,252 and therefore having no prerequisite to establish inflicted
harm resulting from infringing conduct, it is not so much actual or potential
commercial harm that is suspect. Rather, it is that the patent holder is losing
market control. A blanket rejection of subjective territoriality in the context of
offers and sales is not compatible with that premise. Furthermore, in a cross-border
environment, where there are by definition multiple points of contact, it is
245 See Wasserman, supra note 8, at 303; Morris, supra note 176, at 365–68; Hutchison &
Yahya, supra note 85, at 54.
246 See supra notes 88–90 for cases holding that offers or sales directed at customers in a
particular country are considered to infringe in those markets.
247 See supra notes 94–97. See also Boegli-Gravures SA v. Darsail-Asp Ltd., [2009] England
and Wales High Court, EWHC 2690 (Pat) at 100–01 (U.K.) (holding that website to supply the
world at large was not sufficiently targeted at the forum); Omnibill (PTY) Ltd. v. Egpsxxx Ltd.
(In Liquidation), [2014] Intellectual Property Enterprise Court, EWHC 3762 (IPEC) at 12–41
(U.K.) (holding that a website in English language could be deemed to target multiple countries).
248 See Wasserman, supra note 8, at 302–03.
249 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2157–58.
250 See infra Section V(B)(2)(b).
251 Edwin D. Garlepp, An Analysis of the Patentee's New Exclusive Right to “Offer to Sell”, 81
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 315, 326 (1999). See also Miller, supra note 110, at 432–33.
252 See supra note 205.
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increasingly becoming recognized that each and every territorial contact is capable
of forming a jurisdictional basis. Outside the patent context, the Canadian
Supreme Court has held that: “[i]n terms of the Internet, relevant connecting
factors would include the situs of the content provider, the host server, the
intermediaries and the end user . . . that Canada could exercise copyright
jurisdiction in respect [to] both of transmissions originating here, and
transmissions originating abroad but received here, is not only consistent with our
general law but with both national and international copyright practice.”253 Similar
arguments have also been raised by courts in the United States and in Europe,
attaching significance to each connecting factor relevant for the infringing
conduct.254
The domestic adjudication of offers or sales directed at foreign markets can,
as other commentators have mentioned,255 aid in establishing more efficient
enforcement mechanisms by consolidating what would otherwise be individual,
offshore infringements. In that same line, if the defendant has no assets in the
countries where recipients are located, and is domiciled in a jurisdiction
unsusceptible to enforcing foreign judgments, then the patent holder will
essentially be left without legal recourse to stop the ongoing deprivation of foreign
markets unless subjective territoriality is acknowledged as a basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction. It would seem highly prejudicial to harbor such tortious conduct. A
formulaic rejection of such a basis of jurisdiction also poses a risk of being
counterproductive to its own proposed objective. Even if actual or potential
customers are foreign, there can still be a local commercial impact as a result of
the cross-border conduct. The rise of foreign infringing markets can detract focus
and value from domestic markets, and price erosion is a real and cognizable
harm.256 Even if that harm would be less as compared to a purely domestic offer or
sale, we should be careful in adopting a blanket rule as to what economic threshold
is sufficient or insufficient. Admittedly, there are noticeable dangers with inviting
this form of infringing conduct, in particular the risk of conflicting judgments, 257
but this is no different from other forms of extraterritorial applications and is a
risk that can be plausibly managed in the subsequent proposed steps in the
jurisdictional analysis. This same logic could also extend to cases where individual
components are shipped to foreign markets for combination into the patented

253 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers [2004] Canadian Supreme Court, 2 S.C.R. 427, SCC 45 at 61, 76 (Can.).
254 See Nat’l Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that a public performance or display includes “each step in the process by which a
protected work wends its way to its audience.” citing David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)); Case C-5/11, Titus Alexander Jochen Donner,
EU:C:2012:370, paras. 26–27 (holding that the distribution right in copyright is characterised by
a series of acts going “at the very least” from the conclusion of a contract of sale to the performance
thereof by delivery to a member of the public, and that acts giving rise to a distribution to the
public may therefore take place in a number of member states); Case C-173/11, Football Dataco
Ltd. et al. v. Sportradar GmbH et al., EU:C:2012:642, paras. 34, 47 (holding that an act of reutilization under the sue generis right is characterised by a series of successive operations,
ranging “at least” from the placing online of the data concerned on that website for it to be
consulted by the public to the transmission of that data to the interested members of the public,
while rejecting that re-utilization must be located exclusively to the territory of the member state
where the web server is located from which the data in question is sent).
255 Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality United States to Sell an Invention Waning-Patent
Infringement for Offering in the Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 746–47 (2004).
256 See Miller, supra note 110, at 445–49.
257 See Peukert, supra note 76, at 211–12.
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product, which indeed the addition of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in the United States is a
testament to.
In sum, to achieve a fair balance of what nexus can be deemed relevant for
what amounts to commercial appropriation of the invention, the guiding question
should therefore be whether the infringing conduct results in or poses a risk of
resulting in commercial impact or depriving commercial control in the relevant
country of protection.
2. Step II: Weighing Contacts
So far, this analysis has been largely one-sided, limiting it to contacts
linked to the relevant country of protection, which is typically the forum. For most
courts, the inquiry stopped here without further considering what contacts can be
attributed to other jurisdictions. But sovereignty involves both rights and
obligations. As it was phrased in Island of Palmas, “[territorial sovereignty] has as
corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other
States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war,
together with the rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign
territory.”258 After defining the contacts to the relevant country of protection, it
should therefore be deemed necessary to weigh these contacts with those in other
countries.259 It cannot be assured that what constitutes sufficient domestic nexus
is overly broad without a comparative approach. Even if the achievement of the
technical contribution is localized to the forum, that is under the application of
national law. Because of that, there can be multiple loci sharing the same technical
appropriation. If undertaking both a subjective and objective territorial approach
in assessing what is actual or potential commercial harm or control, then courts
are similarly faced with a multitude of connecting factors in different jurisdictions.
Previous proposals that consider foreign sovereignty have either deferred entirely
to those interests or provided insufficient guidance for how to weigh the different
factors. The proposition in this article combines different elements from these
proposals and fills in gaps in the analysis, forging a new approach that is more
predictable and uniform, while still securing the interests of the patent holder in
access to efficacious patent protection.
a. What is the Nature of the Conflict?
Not all conflicts impose the same strain on foreign sovereignty. As has been
explained previously,260 there are, in principle, two forms of contacts to look for:
conflicts of laws and conflicts of private or public effects. These can be either
independent from each other or related in the sense that effects arise out of those
identified conflicts of laws. It cannot be guaranteed that there is always a conflict
between laws to render appreciable foreign effects. For instance, as has been
Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 829, 839 (1928).
On the importance of weighing foreign interests in cases of jurisdictional conflict, with
examples from antitrust law, see Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary
International Law, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 784, 803–05 (1984); Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory,
Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 656, 659
(2009); Gerber, supra note 208, at 779–83. In the context of intellectual property law, this has in
particular been emphasized by Professor Dinwoodie, see Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 779–87
(proposing, inter alia, foreign interests as a theoretical restraint on asserting prescriptive
jurisdiction in cross-border infringement cases).
260 See supra Section IV(A).
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mentioned,261 if courts in one country rule on an extraterritorial injunction that
compels the defendant to discontinue ubiquitous activities on the internet, that will
have an impact abroad, even if those countries also allow such injunctions.
Sometimes a conflict can also come from something as simple as different factual
evaluations, and thus different outcomes, under substantively identical or similar
laws. A comparative approach that focuses merely on conflicts of laws can therefore
be misleading.
Conflicts of laws can turn on what are more fundamental questions of
patentability and exceptions and limitations.262 Other issues of greater concern are
differences in criteria for enabling prescriptive jurisdiction. Even if flexibility is
afforded to states in that latter regard, it is still clear that substantially different
approaches in choosing connecting factors pose a disruptive risk. Parties engaged
in global commerce must be able to calculate their legal risks with consistency and
predictability. If some countries have greater jurisdictional reach than others, that
is liable to upset global marketplaces as parties would have to relocate business
operations or adjust products or services to satisfy a different legal threshold.
b. What is the Relative Impact of the Infringement in the Relevant Country of
Protection as Compared to Abroad?
Understanding what is the nature of the conflict in turn helps us better
understand what is the relative impact of the infringement in both the relevant
country of protection and abroad. 263 While the proposed framework aims to endorse
connecting factors having actual substantive relevance, there is no guarantee that
the selected forum will also enjoy the strongest interest in prescribing the
infringement. Again, different courts could interpret the connecting factors
differently. If there are significant adverse impacts abroad resulting from the
adjudication, and if the value in an extraterritorial application is relatively small
compared to that, then this should be a crucial factor to weigh in.
A relative impact analysis could be approached from a quantitative or
qualitative perspective, or both. A quantitative analysis ascertains whether the
Id.
The character of the regulatory conflict has also been considered in the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(c), (g), (h) (1986) (explainng that the
unreasonableness of exercising prescriptive jurisdiction is considered by, inter alia, “the character
of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state . . . the extent
to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity, [and] the likelihood of
conflict with regulation by another state.”). This is also similar to one of the considered
Timberlane factors, specifically the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy. See supra note
143; Wasserman, supra note 8, at 304–05.
263 A relative impact analysis is part of the Timberlane factors considered in antitrust and
trademark law. See Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1992);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Say. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976)
(explaining that the “relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere” and the “and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad” are factors to consider). Professor Wasserman
has elaborated on this in the patent context and suggested that a focus should be placed on
differences in market sizes. See Wasserman, supra note 8, at 305. This focus is, however,
theoretically flawed in the sense that it assumes that sovereignty is linked to how large or small
the market is. Instead, sovereignty at its core is equal for all states, regardless of differences in
size. See Robert L. Muse, A Public International Law Critique of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
of the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996), 30
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 241–42 (1996); Ryngaert, supra note 23, at 40–41; Buxbaum,
supra note 259, at 659.
261
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forum where extraterritorial application is sought is an exception from the masses
where there are other competing contacts.264 If it is, then this suggests that greater
deference is warranted. The objective in this regard is to identify cases where the
proposed analysis in localizing the infringement is unduly broad, or where the
measured private or public effects are largely spread out. Although it is conceivable
that legal conflicts could be considered quantitatively, it seems inappropriate in
the absence of deep harmonization.265 A qualitative analysis instead looks for the
comparative effect from the conflict.266 A conflict that turns on fundamental
substantive differences, such as patentability or exceptions and limitations, which
causes the adjudication to have an impact extending beyond the parties to the
dispute, warrants deference as this amplifies the consequences felt abroad. 267 But
the qualitative analysis goes both ways. If the alleged infringing conduct extracts
benefits from the use of the invention which are associated with the domestic
market, and in doing so competes with the patent holder, there is a risk that the
value of the patent rights is hollowed. There is then a strong interest in prescribing
even in the face of an adverse extraterritorial effect.
The intention is not to achieve a mathematical, legal equilibrium from the
analysis above. Such an exercise is doomed to fail and may result in absolute
deference to foreign standards, or a form of forced harmonization. The attention is
instead aimed outwards at identifying what would be colliding effects if proceeding
with the adjudication, and then weighing these relatively inwards.268 There is far
from an international consensus on how to more precisely balance these competing
contacts and, in turn, the interests they represent.269 But regardless of which
theoretical framework is pursued, the history of cases does suggest that the
interests of efficacious domestic patent protection often win the contest,270 and
when that is not the case, that efficacy is forsaken in the name of territoriality. In
both cases, there is an absence of considering and weighing foreign impacts and
264 Similar factors are included in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 403(2)(c) (1986) (considering when exercising prescriptive jurisdiction “the extent to which
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation
is generally accepted.”).
265 For a similar view, see Wasserman, supra note 8, at 304.
266 Cf. Dinwoodie, supra note 85, at 776–84 (suggesting a qualitative framework in the
context of trademark law to act as a restraint on extraterritoriality).
267 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2177–78.
268 Cf. Buxbaum, supra note 259, at 659 (comparing an “inward” and “outward” perspective
to prescriptive jurisdiction and emphasizing the importance of the latter).
269 See Gerber, supra note 208, at 756 (stating that the international community has failed
to develop jurisdictional principles accommodating both the needs of regulating states while
avoiding impinging on the legitimate interests of other states); Kevin R. Roberts, Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws: Minimizing the Conflicts, 1 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 325, 348 (2015) (stating that international rules on balancing sovereign interests are not
fully developed). Professor Meeseen has proposed, although in the context of antitrust law and
drawing from German experiences, that “a state is prohibited from taking measures of antitrust
law if the regulatory interests it is pursuing are outweighed by the interests of one or more foreign
states likely to be seriously injured by those measures.” See Meessen, supra note 259, at 804.
Professors Grossfeld and Rogers have instead argued that deference to foreign mandatory law
may be appropriate if that law “expresses values shared in common and which the receiving
country is itself willing to protect.” See Bernhard Grossfeld & C. Paul Rogers, A Shared Values
Approach to Jurisdictional Conflicts in International Economic Law, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 931,
939 (1983).
270 See supra Section III(E)(2). A familiar example is the Illumina case, where the Court
emphasized the adverse effects on efficacy of domestic patent protection without considering the
risk for substantive conflicts. See Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and
Wales High Court, EWHC 2930 (Pat) at 508 (U.K.).
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related interests.271 A relative impact analysis instead suggests a middle-ground
between these two extremes, and that prescriptive jurisdiction should at least take
into account the actual or potential conflicting effects, quantitatively or
qualitatively. Whether that should then result in deference or defiance cannot be
given a blanket statement.
c. Will an Extraterritorial Application of National Law Render Foreign Patent
Protection Obsolete?
A question which has been raised earlier is to what extent the failure to
obtain a foreign patent should implicate the question of localization. It has been
suggested that it would be unrealistic to require patent protection in all the
countries of interest before engaging in an extraterritorial application,272 which is
particularly true if the infringing conduct is ubiquitous in nature. Furthermore,
even if we would engage in a hypothetical exercise, as has been proposed by
Professor Holbrook,273 of whether patent protection could have been procured
abroad, this could easily be circumvented. A prospective infringer could
preemptively do that same exercise and simply start their operations in a country
where a patent could not have been obtained, which suggests that the failure to
procure patent protection abroad is not a workable enough criterion.
A better approach would be to ask whether an extraterritorial application
would render patent protection, regardless of whether or not that has been
procured, obsolete in all other countries implicated by the same infringing act. The
objective is to look for a broader foreign impact, which would essentially make it
unnecessary to seek out national remedies in other countries. If approached
correctly, this should reveal whether the prescriptive assertion goes too far such
that it avoids the need for foreign patent protection, without at the same time
penalizing the patent holder for not having procured or enforced such protection.
In practice, this situation would become most relevant in cases of outbound
regulation, where the primary effect is felt abroad and where the main interest in
adjudication is located.
d. Is an Extraterritorial Application Necessary to Provide Remedies?
While it has been said that cross-border conduct makes it an absolute
necessity to localize infringements,274 this should not be confused with that an
extraterritorial application is always necessary to provide adequate remedies. In
some cases, the foreign impact can be avoided altogether while still providing
efficient legal recourse. If we return to the above-mentioned example of an
injunction that targets digital content, which is accessible everywhere, it is obvious
that a take-down order of that content from courts in country A would prevent
access in all other countries.275 An order to instead impose geo-blocking measures,
which restricts merely access to the website within country A, would be a simple

Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2163.
See supra Section IV(E).
273 Holbrook, supra note 1, at 2178–81.
274 See supra Section III(E)(1).
275 See supra Section IV(A), with reference in particular to La Ligue Contre le Racisme et
l’Antisémitisme and l’Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo Inc! and Yahoo France [May
22, 2000] High Court of Paris (Fr.).
271
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but practical solution that goes a long way in providing the needed remedy, without
engaging in an extraterritorial application on the level of enforcement. 276
In other situations, it may well be that the alleged infringing conduct is
misplaced. If we take the Illumina case as an example, the plaintiffs asserted
patent infringement on the basis that the patented method was used or offered for
use in the United Kingdom, since the material used for that purpose was collected
there. The Court agreed hypothetically, and never proceeded to examine whether
infringement occurred because the products obtained from the patented process
were offered for disposal in the United Kingdom.277 There would have been no real
need to frustrate the statutory language if the focus had been on other exclusive
rights. This simply reaffirms a previous point that has been made: it is critical that
patent holders invoke their exclusive rights in the proper context.
3. Step III: Weighing Accountability and Intentions
The analysis above has already covered public, private, and sovereign
interests to the extent these are related to established contacts. But there are
variations of these interests which are not attributable to contacts, and which must
be independently examined in a third step of the analysis. These outstanding
interests can essentially be grouped into accountability of the patent holder and
intentions of the alleged infringer to gain benefits from domestic markets while
avoiding liability.
a. Is Patent Drafting Causing the Need for an Extraterritorial Application?
Part of what makes divided patent infringement unique is that the
language of the patent is within the control of the patent applicant and,
subsequently, the beneficiary as a right holder. While it has been submitted above
that it is unfair to penalize the patent holder for failure to procure patent protection
in foreign countries implicated by an extraterritorial application, the question still
remains whether the patent holder should assume accountability towards the
patent drafting. Previous proposals have largely focused on concrete claim drafting
options. Professor Lemley et al. have suggested that unitary claims should be
drafted and that independent product claims are included to the extent possible.278
While several drawbacks have been noted above with drafting unitary claims, 279
there is no doubt that the inclusion of multiple independent claims in different
formats can dramatically alter infringement scenarios, and more so in cross-border
contexts. If it becomes clear that more careful and exhaustive claim drafting could
have avoided the need to turn to an extraterritorial application, then this turns
into another factor that speaks in favor of denying such extraordinary legal
recourse.
b. Is There an Intention to Benefit from the Invention in the Domestic Market?
Some commentators have resorted to subjective criteria for avoiding
infringement as a means of resolving the divided infringement dilemma, either in
See Trimble, supra note 133, at 532–33.
Illumina, Inc. v. Premaitha Health Plc, [2017] England and Wales High Court, EWHC
2930 (Pat) at 507–08 (U.K.).
278 See Lemley et al., supra note 15, at 271–76.
279 See supra Section V(A).
276
277
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whole or in part.280 This can certainly be useful in filling gaps or unclarities as to
where conduct should be subject to prescriptive jurisdiction. But as has been
explained earlier,281 it can also be problematic as it does not itself aid in
distinguishing cases where there are legitimate cross-border practices from those
where there is an intention to avoid liability. The mere fact that an actor is engaged
in cross-border practices, even if originating from a country where there is no
infringement, is clearly insufficient to attribute an adverse intention.
Instead of fixating on whether there is an intention to avoid liability by
partitioning the conduct across borders, the focus should be whether there is an
intention to benefit from the invention in the domestic market. This is similar, in
part, to how intention as a concept was invoked in Prepaid-Karten II. Because it
was found that the infringing actions demonstrated an intention to extract a
commercial advantage from using the invention in the country of protection, it was
deemed that an infringement occurred there.282 The important difference to the
present proposal is that it is emphasized that this intention does not have to be
commercial, but can instead be technical, depending on what is the assumed
appropriation of the invention. 283 Furthermore, intention is an optional, and not a
required, factor linked to the infringing conduct. This is significant as patent
infringement again is a strict liability tort. How intention is invoked here is only
something that can benefit rather than encumber the patent holder in dubious
cases of cross-border infringement. This additional factor to consider would be
exceptionally relevant in cases where there are multiple possible loci, and a serious
question is raised if one is sufficient enough to mandate jurisdiction without at the
same time overtaxing the other.
4. Step IV: Weighing Contacts and Interests Against the Nexus
Each of the preceding steps has established criteria that serve to guide
when prescriptive jurisdiction can be asserted uniformly and predictably in
cross-border contexts, granting the patent holder necessary remedies while
avoiding expansive and adverse interference into other jurisdictions having
competing contacts or interests. It has here been proposed that we should adopt a
technical test that ascertains where the technical contribution is achieved. By
attributing all claim elements to that same locus, the issue of divided infringement
dilemma is resolved but for necessary controls to avoid overly broad
interpretations. This neatly fits within existing legal frameworks and preserves
consistency in the infringement analysis while providing a reasonable degree of
280 Wasserman, supra note 8, at 306 (proposing intent or harm on domestic commerce as a
relevant factor to consider in asserting prescriptive jurisdiction). One of the Timberlane factors,
as relied on by the Ninth Circuit in antitrust and trademark law, also included “the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce.” See Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Say. Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976).
281 See supra Section IV(D).
282 See Prepaid-Karten II, Court of Appeals of Düsseldorf, Dec. 10, 2009, 2 U 51/08 (Ger.).
283 This would also differ from the targeting doctrine in that the intention is here linked to
the nexus underlying the infringing conduct. The targeting doctrine, on the other hand, is
primarily used for discerning commercial intent to target a particular territory in ubiquitous
environments, rather than the subject matter itself. See Case C‑173/11, Football Dataco v.
Sportradar, EU:C:2012:642, paras. 39–41 (stating intention on part of the performer as the
criteria to discern targeting to a particular territory, and attract the interest of that public); Merck
KGaA v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., [2017] England and Wales Court of Appeal, EWCA Civ
1834 at 170 (U.K.) (listing expressions of an intent to solicit domestic customers as a relevant
factor).
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certainty when localizing the infringement. Since the issue of divided patent claims
does not exist for cases of commercial appropriation, the focus here instead lies in
ascertaining commercial impact and control to single out contacts where there is a
legitimate interest in prescribing jurisdiction, as it is related to the alleged
infringing conduct. This is best achieved, it is argued, by allowing both subjective
and objective territorial factors.
In the case of either technical or commercial appropriations, we are often
concerned with multiple contacts and competing interests that need to be weighed.
The objective here is to minimize encroachments upon foreign sovereignty to the
extent that it is possible. It therefore makes sense to constrain an extraterritorial
application so long it is still possible for the patent holder to receive adequate
remedies. But sovereignty cannot be viewed in isolation. Since we are here
concerned with actions from private parties, there must be some accountability
towards both the patent holder and the alleged infringing party. As an additional
filter to discern when an extraterritorial application is really necessary, repairing
what is plainly careless patent drafting should therefore be avoided at the cost of
others. Moreover, if it still remains doubtful whether an extraterritorial
application is appropriate, attributing legal relevance to a manifested intention to
take advantage of the invention in the domestic market should be considered.
Each of these steps has to be looked at holistically, as there is an inherent
relationship between them. If the appropriation is technical, then how the
technical contribution is defined and localized will necessarily impact what the
relative impact is in the relevant country of protection as compared to abroad.
Whether there is an intention to benefit from the invention in the domestic market
will influence what is the nature of the conflict. Whether improper patent drafting
is causing the need for extraterritorial measures is likewise impacting whether
that remedy is really necessary. Similarly, if the appropriation is commercial, then
localizing the commercial impact and control as part of the infringing conduct will
again guide the analysis of the what is the nature of the conflict, what is the
relative impact, and whether an extraterritorial application is necessary or not.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an age of globalization, where we are faced with an unprecedented
movement of products, services, and information across borders, it is clear that the
law has failed to keep up with these economic and technological developments. It
is a truism that patents are territorial rights and that this will continue to remain
the legal foundation in patent law in the foreseeable future. Courts in different
jurisdictions have long struggled, and still do, with construing those legal
implications in cross-border contexts. Divided patent infringement across borders
has persisted as a problem largely because of a formulaic assumption that all claim
elements and components of the infringing acts must occur within the relevant
country of protection. This assumption is, as has been explained throughout this
article, fundamentally misplaced. There is a difference between, on the one hand,
localizing all claim elements and components of infringing acts to a particular
country of protection and, on the other hand, localizing the infringement itself to
that country. Where an infringement can be localized is a legal conclusion. The
legal fact that patents remain territorial does not itself bar taking into account
facts that have transpired abroad, but which have legal significance to that end.
Courts in a growing number of jurisdictions have begun to acknowledge
these legal realities. What started out as strict adherence to territoriality has
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gradually shifted towards extraterritoriality, where foreign conduct is regulated in
an effort to protect the patent holder either from spillover effects resulting from
conduct abroad, or from conduct originating within the forum. This up-and-coming
legal evolution has, however, been inconsistent at best, and unsubstantiated at
worst. In the face of these legal irregularities in multiple jurisdictions, patent
holders and users are combating against unpredictability and lack of uniformity
while states are confronted with a lack of control.
This article presents a substantive balancing test as a new approach to
closing the patent loophole. A split technical respectively commercial analysis is
proposed depending on what the alleged infringing conduct is, which frames it in
its proper substantive light. If the appropriation is technical, a technical test is
proposed that narrows down what the nexus to the country of protection is, based
on the technical contribution of the invention. The locus of where the technical
contribution is achieved in turn becomes the proxy to apply a single national law
to the entire infringing conduct. If the appropriation is commercial, however, then
this analysis shifts to localizing the infringing conduct using more traditional
subjective or objective territorial factors. It is on the basis of this defined nexus
that we then turn to weigh other identified contacts that can be attributed to the
same infringing conduct. This ensures that the jurisdictional analysis is not made
in isolation to competing foreign contacts and interests, but rather acts as a
filtering mechanism to avoid overly broad or unnecessary extraterritorial
applications, while further considering what due accountability should be
attributed to the patent holder and possible adverse intentions from the alleged
infringer. These different steps are not mechanically or independently ticked, but
are necessarily interrelated and thus weighed against each other. The
overwhelming purpose is to safeguard the efficacy of patent protection in
cross-border cases when localizing the infringing conduct while providing a
reasonable degree of predictability and ensuring that sovereign, public, and private
interests are duly taken into account. This demonstrates that the patent loophole
indeed can be closed across borders, without engaging in comprehensive and
unfeasible harmonization and without sacrificing fundamental objectives in the
process.

